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   In	  this	  paper	  we	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  Americans’	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  
immigration	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare.	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  
Election	  Study	  (CANES)	  from	  1992-­‐2012,	  we	  find	  ample	  evidence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  immigration	  
attitudes	  on	  both	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  increased	  
welfare	  spending.	  These	  immigration	  effects	  persist	  even	  in	  face	  of	  statistical	  controls	  for	  attitudes	  
toward	  African	  Americans	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor;	  indeed,	  in	  our	  models	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  surpasses	  the	  magnitude	  of	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  and	  the	  
poor.	  Further,	  our	  finding	  of	  immigration	  effects	  withstands	  a	  range	  of	  robustness	  tests.	  Our	  findings	  
point	  to	  the	  possible	  "immigrationalization"	  of	  Americans’	  welfare	  attitudes	  and	  provide	  strong	  
evidence	  that	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigration	  and	  immigrants	  is	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  how	  they	  
think	  about	  welfare.	  
	  




	   Over	  the	  last	  several	  decades,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  witnessed	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  its	  
immigrant	  population.	  From	  1970	  to	  2007,	  the	  foreign-­‐born	  population	  quadrupled	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  exceeded	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  population	  in	  several	  states	  (Census	  1999;	  Census	  2007).	  This	  large	  
influx	  of	  immigrants	  has	  led	  to	  profound	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  changes	  in	  American	  life	  and	  has	  
drawn	  considerable	  attention	  from	  both	  scholars	  and	  policy	  makers.	  Concern	  that	  immigrants	  will	  place	  
a	  heavy	  burden	  on	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  has	  prompted	  many	  Americans	  to	  question	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
immigrants	  in	  the	  United	  States	  should	  be	  given	  access	  to	  the	  panoply	  of	  programs	  that	  comprise	  the	  
social	  welfare	  state.	  	  	  
	   Compared	  to	  its	  European	  counterparts,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  known	  to	  have	  a	  less	  generous	  welfare	  
state	  and	  a	  public	  that	  is	  less	  enthusiastic	  about	  welfare.	  Scholars	  have	  considered	  a	  variety	  of	  
explanations	  for	  the	  relative	  reluctance	  of	  Americans	  to	  support	  an	  expanded	  welfare	  state,	  but	  one	  
explanation	  suggests	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  for	  welfare	  among	  Americans	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  
racial	  divide	  between	  whites	  and	  blacks	  (Quadagno	  1994;	  Gilens	  2000;	  Alesina	  and	  Glaeser	  2004).	  The	  
argument	  is	  that	  white	  Americans’	  perceptions	  that	  blacks	  are	  lazy	  and	  heavily	  rely	  on	  welfare	  
assistance	  directly	  result	  in	  their	  low	  levels	  of	  welfare	  support	  (Gilens	  2000).	  More	  recent	  empirical	  
studies	  also	  find	  that	  in	  neighborhoods,	  cities,	  and	  states	  with	  higher	  racial	  diversity,	  public	  support	  for	  
welfare	  is	  lower	  and	  public	  goods	  provisions	  are	  also	  less	  generous	  (Alesina,	  Baqir	  and	  Easterly	  1999;	  
Luttmer	  2001;	  Alesina	  and	  Glaeser	  2004).	  	  
	   While	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  black-­‐white	  racial	  divide	  in	  American	  society	  has	  played	  at	  least	  
some	  role	  in	  shaping	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state,	  we	  suggest	  that	  the	  recent	  large	  influx	  of	  immigrants	  
has	  caused	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  America’s	  demographic	  landscape	  and	  influenced	  Americans’	  views	  
about	  the	  modern	  welfare	  state	  and	  its	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  	  We	  argue	  here	  that	  the	  
American	  welfare	  state	  today	  has	  become	  more	  “immigrationalized”	  than	  “racialized,”	  insofar	  as	  how	  
Americans	  think	  about	  immigration	  has	  now	  become	  an	  important	  explanation	  for	  welfare	  support	  in	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America.	  	  As	  a	  starting	  point,	  we	  explore	  the	  linkage	  between	  Americans’	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  
and	  immigrants	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  state.	  We	  use	  data	  from	  the	  Cumulative	  
American	  National	  Election	  Study	  (CANES)	  for	  selected	  years	  from	  1992	  to	  2012	  to	  estimate	  a	  series	  of	  
models	  that	  permit	  us	  to	  analyze	  the	  connection	  between	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants,	  on	  one	  hand,	  
and	  support	  for	  greater	  welfare	  spending	  and	  favorable	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  on	  the	  
other.	  Our	  findings	  point	  to	  the	  strong	  and	  consistent	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  in	  shaping	  
individuals’	  views	  toward	  the	  American	  welfare	  state.	  	  
IMMIGRATION	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  
	   The	  United	  States	  has	  witnessed	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  immigrant	  population	  over	  the	  past	  
four	  decades.	  Based	  on	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  foreign-­‐born	  population	  in	  the	  United	  States	  from	  1850	  to	  2010	  
(see	  Figure	  1),	  one	  can	  see	  that	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  comprised	  of	  immigrants	  decreased	  
steadily	  from	  a	  high	  of	  14.7%	  in	  1910	  to	  a	  low	  of	  4.7%	  in	  1970,	  but	  since	  then	  the	  immigrant	  population	  
has	  increased	  substantially	  to	  a	  recent	  high	  of	  12.9%	  in	  2010	  (U.S.	  Census,	  2013).	  Moreover,	  while	  there	  
is	  considerable	  variation	  across	  the	  American	  states	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  the	  immigrant	  population,	  
most	  states—in	  fact,	  all	  but	  three—have	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  immigrant	  population	  
percentage.	  In	  Table	  1	  we	  present	  data	  on	  the	  immigrant	  population	  percentage	  in	  each	  state	  from	  1996	  
and	  2008,	  which	  illustrates	  the	  substantial	  growth	  in	  states	  like	  Georgia,	  Kentucky	  and	  Tennessee	  where	  
the	  foreign	  born	  population	  more	  than	  tripled.	  In	  2008,	  the	  foreign-­‐born	  population	  exceeded	  one	  fifth	  
of	  the	  population	  in	  six	  states-­‐California	  (33.5%),	  New	  Jersey	  (25.9%),	  New	  York	  (25.4%),	  Florida	  (22.7%),	  
Nevada	  (21.63%),	  and	  Hawaii	  (20.7%).	  Clearly,	  the	  immigrant	  population	  has	  increased	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  overall,	  and	  in	  some	  states	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  immigrant	  population	  has	  been	  substantial.	  As	  a	  
result,	  immigration	  has	  become	  a	  highly	  salient	  issue	  for	  the	  American	  public.	  	  
	   Large	  scale	  immigration	  has	  led	  to	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  changes	  in	  American	  life	  that	  have	  
drawn	  considerable	  attention	  from	  scholars.	  One	  important	  question	  is	  how	  immigration	  has	  influenced	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Source:	  U.S.	  Census,	  decennial	  censuses,	  1900	  to	  2000;	  American	  Community	  Survey,	  2010.	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Table	  1:	  Change	  of	  Percentage	  of	  foreign-­‐born	  population,	  1996-­‐2008	  
State	   1996	   2008	   %Increase	   	   State	   1996	  	   2008	  	   %Increase	  
Alabama	   1.73%	  	   4.06%	  	   134.68%	   	   Montana	   1.94%	  	   1.71%	  	   -­‐11.83%	  
Alaska	   4.75%	  	   7.31%	  	   53.92%	   	   Nebraska	   3.76%	  	   7.29%	  	   94.14%	  
Arizona	   14.91%	  	   17.42%	  	   16.87%	   	   Nevada	   13.66%	  	   21.63%	  	   58.33%	  
Arkansas	   1.93%	  	   4.58%	  	   136.97%	   	   New	  Hampshire	   3.95%	  	   5.91%	  	   49.45%	  
California	   29.96%	  	   33.52%	  	   11.88%	   	   New	  Jersey	   17.41%	  	   25.86%	  	   48.56%	  
Colorado	   7.19%	  	   12.00%	  	   66.89%	   	   New	  Mexico	   13.66%	  	   11.31%	  	   -­‐17.23%	  
Connecticut	   11.01%	  	   15.19%	  	   37.90%	   	   New	  York	   21.93%	  	   25.42%	  	   15.93%	  
Delaware	   5.23%	  	   12.77%	  	   144.32%	   	   North	  Carolina	   4.02%	  	   7.79%	  	   93.78%	  
Florida	   17.33%	  	   22.65%	  	   30.68%	   	   North	  Dakota	   1.47%	  	   2.20%	  	   48.99%	  
Georgia	   3.80%	  	   11.78%	  	   209.63%	   	   Ohio	   2.90%	  	   4.20%	  	   44.82%	  
Hawaii	   20.48%	  	   20.70%	  	   1.06%	   	   Oklahoma	   2.36%	  	   4.89%	  	   107.48%	  
Idaho	   4.56%	  	   6.06%	  	   33.09%	   	   Oregon	   8.52%	  	   9.71%	  	   13.97%	  
Illinois	   10.76%	  	   15.77%	  	   46.53%	   	   Pennsylvania	   4.45%	  	   5.42%	  	   21.78%	  
Indiana	   2.49%	  	   4.24%	  	   69.85%	   	   Rhode	  Island	   12.43%	  	   14.34%	  	   15.31%	  
Iowa	   2.63%	  	   6.09%	  	   132.02%	   	   South	  Carolina	   1.59%	  	   4.26%	  	   167.51%	  
Kansas	   4.83%	  	   6.46%	  	   33.88%	   	   South	  Dakota	   1.67%	  	   3.43%	  	   105.12%	  
Kentucky	   1.04%	  	   3.64%	  	   250.63%	   	   Tennessee	   1.72%	  	   5.29%	  	   206.93%	  
Louisiana	   2.23%	  	   3.76%	  	   68.28%	   	   Texas	   13.79%	  	   19.56%	  	   41.83%	  
Maine	   3.52%	  	   3.10%	  	   -­‐11.87%	   	   Utah	   6.89%	  	   9.98%	  	   44.98%	  
Maryland	   8.83%	  	   16.72%	  	   89.43%	   	   Vermont	   3.76%	  	   3.97%	  	   5.51%	  
Massachusetts	   12.16%	  	   16.34%	  	   34.42%	   	   Virginia	   6.88%	  	   12.87%	  	   87.13%	  
Michigan	   6.00%	  	   7.85%	  	   30.94%	   	   Washington	   8.01%	  	   13.72%	  	   71.16%	  
Minnesota	   4.63%	  	   7.95%	  	   71.78%	   	   West	  Virginia	   1.02%	  	   1.10%	  	   7.76%	  
Mississippi	   1.58%	  	   2.88%	  	   82.12%	   	   Wisconsin	   3.47%	  	   5.87%	  	   69.37%	  
Missouri	   2.20%	  	   4.02%	  	   82.78%	   	   Wyoming	   2.20%	  	   2.91%	  	   32.16%	  
	  
Data	  source:	  Current	  Population	  Survey,	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  various	  years	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the	  evolution	  of	  the	  American	  welfare	  system.	  On	  its	  face,	  the	  immigrant	  population	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  has	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  that	  would	  make	  many	  immigrants	  prime	  candidates	  for	  
participation	  in	  various	  facets	  of	  the	  American	  welfare	  state.	  According	  to	  his	  analysis	  of	  data	  from	  the	  
2010	  and	  2011	  Current	  Population	  Survey	  (CPS),	  Camarota	  (2012)	  finds	  that	  immigrants	  are	  substantially	  
more	  likely	  to	  have	  less	  than	  a	  high-­‐school	  degree	  than	  native-­‐born	  Americans	  (28.1%	  to	  7.2%),	  and	  
immigrants	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  completed	  some	  college	  (16.9%	  to	  29.8%)	  or	  have	  a	  college	  degree	  
(29.0%	  to	  32.8%)	  than	  native-­‐born	  Americans.	  Immigrants	  have	  lower	  median	  incomes	  than	  native-­‐born	  
Americans	  ($34,021	  to	  $43,701),	  as	  well	  as	  lower	  median	  incomes	  per	  household	  member	  ($13,930	  to	  
$20,955).	  Further,	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  poverty	  (19.9%	  to	  13.5%),	  and	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  
43.6%	  to	  31.1%	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  native-­‐born	  Americans	  to	  live	  in	  “near”	  poverty	  (i.e.,	  
under	  200%	  of	  the	  poverty	  threshold	  for	  a	  given	  family	  size).	  According	  to	  CPS	  data	  from	  2011,	  
immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  without	  health	  insurance	  (34.1%	  to	  13.8%)	  and	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  
home	  owners	  (51.8%	  to	  68.5%).	  	  
	   These	  characteristics	  fit	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  welfare-­‐active	  population	  and	  appear	  to	  translate	  into	  a	  
greater	  likelihood	  that	  immigrants	  will	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  American	  welfare	  system,	  since	  similarly-­‐
situated	  native-­‐born	  Americans	  would	  likely	  be	  relatively	  high	  participants	  in	  welfare	  programs.	  There	  is	  
some	  evidence	  that	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐immigrants	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  welfare	  
system.	  Using	  CPS	  data	  from	  2010	  and	  2011,	  Camarota	  (2012)	  finds	  that	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  
native-­‐born	  Americans	  to	  receive	  funds	  from	  two	  broad	  sets	  of	  programs:	  (1)	  food	  assistance,	  such	  as	  
Supplemental	  Nutrition	  Assistance	  Program	  (SNAP,	  aka	  food	  stamps)	  and	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  (24.1%	  
to	  13.9%);	  and	  (2)	  Medicaid	  (28.4%	  to	  17.5%).	  Immigrants	  and	  native-­‐born	  Americans	  are	  roughly	  
equally	  likely	  to	  receive	  funds	  from	  two	  other	  categories	  of	  programs:	  (1)	  cash	  assistance	  programs,	  
such	  as	  Temporary	  Assistance	  for	  Needy	  Families	  (TANF),	  Supplemental	  Security	  Income	  (SSI),	  and	  state	  
general	  assistance	  (5.8%	  for	  immigrants,	  5.4%	  for	  native-­‐born	  Americans);	  and	  (2)	  subsidized	  housing	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(4.6%	  to	  4.3%).1	  	  Overall,	  an	  estimated	  36.3%	  of	  immigrants	  are	  participants	  in	  at	  least	  one	  of	  these	  
governmental	  assistance	  programs,	  compared	  to	  approximately	  22.8%	  of	  non-­‐immigrants.	  	  
	   Given	  the	  relative	  socioeconomic	  status	  and	  the	  relatively	  higher	  program	  participation	  rates	  for	  
immigrants,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  if	  Americans’	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  state	  were	  influenced,	  
at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants,	  immigration,	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  foreign-­‐born	  
composition	  of	  the	  American	  population.	  Immigration	  is	  a	  divisive	  issue	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  there	  
are	  many	  Americans	  who	  disagree	  about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  immigration	  should	  be	  expanded,	  
reduced,	  or	  kept	  the	  same.	  Further,	  Americans	  disagree	  sharply	  over	  immigration	  policy	  (e.g.,	  path	  to	  
citizenship,	  deportation	  of	  illegal	  immigrants,	  guest	  worker	  program),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
immigrants—particularly	  those	  who	  are	  not	  citizens	  and/or	  who	  are	  in	  the	  United	  States	  without	  
documentation	  and	  legal	  status—should	  be	  eligible	  for	  government	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  the	  same	  way	  
that	  native-­‐born	  Americans	  should	  be.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence—primarily	  from	  Western	  
European	  countries—that	  increased	  population	  diversity	  of	  the	  sort	  associated	  with	  greater	  immigration	  
has	  the	  effect	  of	  changing	  how	  individuals	  think	  about	  welfare	  policies	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
individuals	  support	  anti-­‐poverty	  and	  redistributive	  policies	  (Eger	  2010;	  Larsen	  2011;	  Mau	  and	  Burkhardt	  
2009;	  Senik,	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Bay	  and	  Pedersen	  2006).	  We	  suggest	  that	  the	  possible	  connection	  between	  how	  
Americans	  think	  about	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  welfare	  programs,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  how	  Americans	  think	  
about	  immigration	  and	  immigrants,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  an	  important	  and	  potentially-­‐fruitful	  topic	  for	  
study.	  
PREVIOUS	  RESEARCH:	  WHAT	  DO	  WE	  KNOW?	  
	   The	  relationship	  between	  race	  and	  the	  American	  welfare	  state	  has	  a	  long	  and	  well-­‐documented	  
history.	  	  Historical	  accounts	  of	  the	  initial	  construction	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  argue	  that	  race	  played	  a	  major	  
role	  in	  its	  design	  (Brown	  1999;	  Liberman	  1998;	  Noble	  1997;	  Handler	  1995).	  In	  addition,	  a	  number	  of	  
quantitative	  analyses	  find	  links	  between	  minority	  caseload	  and	  welfare	  expenditures,	  measured	  as	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overall	  spending	  and/or	  monthly	  cash	  benefits	  (Howard	  1999;	  Orr	  1976;	  Plotnick	  and	  Winters	  1985;	  
Wright	  1976).	  Moreover,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  has	  examined	  how	  attitudes	  toward	  racial	  minorities	  
and	  stereotypes	  affect	  opinions	  on	  welfare	  (Gilens	  2000;	  Johnson,	  2003;	  Jacoby	  1994;	  Nelson	  1999;	  
Peffley,	  Hurwitz,	  and	  Schneiderman	  1997;	  Soss,	  Fording,	  and	  Schram	  2011).	  
	   The	  work	  of	  Martin	  Gilens	  (2000)	  is	  an	  important	  starting	  point	  in	  understanding	  how	  attitudes	  
toward	  immigration	  can	  be	  related	  to	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare,	  even	  though	  his	  research	  was	  not	  about	  
immigration.	  Gilens	  offers	  the	  provocative	  hypothesis	  that	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  blacks	  has	  a	  
strong	  effect	  on	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  welfare,	  and	  in	  his	  empirical	  analyses	  he	  finds	  strong	  
support	  for	  this	  assertion.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  welfare	  policy	  is	  highly	  racialized,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
Americans	  perceive	  African	  Americans	  as	  being	  disproportionately	  likely	  to	  be	  recipients	  of	  welfare	  
policies;	  this	  connection	  prompts	  Americans	  to	  link	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  with	  their	  attitudes	  
toward	  welfare.	  Obviously,	  Gilens’	  work	  is	  about	  racial	  attitudes	  and	  support	  for	  welfare,	  and	  our	  work	  
is	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  support	  for	  welfare.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  draw	  
parallels	  between	  Gilens’	  arguments	  and	  the	  linkage	  between	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  public	  
support	  for	  welfare.	  If,	  for	  instance,	  immigrants	  are	  over-­‐represented	  among	  the	  ranks	  of	  welfare	  
recipients,	  it	  is	  not	  implausible	  to	  argue	  that	  Americans	  might	  have	  shifted	  their	  attention	  from	  African	  
Americans	  to	  immigrants	  when	  they	  assess	  their	  welfare	  attitudes,	  precisely	  because	  of	  a	  similar	  fear	  
that	  immigrants	  might	  absorb	  welfare	  resources.	  
	   Empirical	  research	  conducted	  in	  western	  developed	  countries-­‐-­‐especially	  in	  Europe-­‐-­‐shows	  some	  
support	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  either	  the	  presence	  of	  immigrants	  in	  one’s	  context	  or	  individuals’	  
subjective	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  can	  influence	  public	  support	  for	  welfare	  (Burgoon,	  Koster,	  and	  
van	  Egmond,	  2010;	  Eger	  2010;	  Hjerm	  and	  Schnabel	  2012;	  Larsen	  2011;	  Mau	  and	  Burkhardt	  2009;	  
Sumino	  2013).	  Specifically,	  increased	  immigration	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  
heterogeneity	  of	  a	  given	  political	  system,	  and	  this	  might	  reduce	  the	  sense	  of	  national	  identity	  and	  social	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solidarity	  needed	  for	  the	  welfare	  state.	  Individuals	  in	  homogenous	  societies	  are	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  
welfare	  system	  because	  welfare	  benefits	  go	  to	  people	  who	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  like	  themselves.	  	  The	  
influx	  of	  immigrants,	  however,	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	  “us”	  and	  “them”	  and	  therefore	  shatters	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  
common	  national	  identity	  and	  severely	  reduces	  social	  solidarity.	  As	  a	  result,	  public	  support	  for	  the	  
welfare	  system	  may	  dwindle	  because	  recipients	  of	  welfare	  programs	  now	  include	  members	  of	  the	  
immigrant	  “out-­‐group,”	  who	  are	  deemed	  as	  less	  worthy	  of	  receiving	  public	  goods.	  Such	  processes	  may	  
be	  in	  place	  even	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Sweden	  (Eger	  2010)	  and	  Denmark	  (Larsen	  2011)	  known	  for	  their	  
generous	  system	  of	  welfare	  benefits.	  
	   Scholars	  have	  long	  associated	  high	  racial	  heterogeneity	  with	  low	  support	  for	  social	  welfare	  in	  a	  
society	  (Miguel	  and	  Gugerty,	  2005;	  Miguel	  1999;	  Hero	  and	  Preuhs	  2007;	  Habyarimana	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Gilens	  
2003;	  Soss,	  Schram,	  Vartanian,	  and	  O'Brien,	  2001;	  Banting	  and	  Kymlicka	  2005;	  Wolfe	  and	  Klausen	  1997).	  
One	  consequence	  of	  increasing	  immigration	  rates	  over	  the	  past	  several	  decades	  is	  increasing	  racial,	  
ethnic,	  or	  nationality	  heterogeneity,	  particularly	  as	  immigrant	  populations	  disperse	  beyond	  the	  typical	  
gateway	  states.	  	  In	  addition,	  immigrants	  are	  shown	  to	  consume	  more	  welfare	  benefits	  than	  native	  
citizens	  in	  the	  United	  States	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  1996	  welfare	  reform	  (Hanson	  2004:	  10;	  Camarota	  
2012).	  	  What	  is	  missing	  from	  much	  of	  the	  extant	  research	  on	  support	  for	  the	  American	  welfare	  state	  is	  
an	  explicit	  consideration	  of	  how	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  immigration	  affect	  
support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  the	  American	  context.	  If	  immigrants	  are	  overrepresented	  among	  the	  
ranks	  of	  welfare	  recipients,	  and	  if	  immigration-­‐driven	  heterogeneity	  influences	  how	  Americans	  think	  
about	  welfare,	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  Americans	  would	  link	  their	  evaluations	  of	  immigration	  and	  
immigrants	  to	  their	  evaluations	  of	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  including	  evaluations	  of	  welfare	  
recipients	  and	  preferences	  for	  spending	  on	  welfare	  programs.	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IMMIGRATION	  AND	  WELFARE	  PREFERENCES	  
	   Why	  should	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  how	  Americans	  evaluate	  the	  welfare	  
state?	  	  We	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  processes	  that	  could	  result	  in	  a	  linkage	  between	  
individuals’	  attitudes	  about	  immigrants	  and	  immigration,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  
programs	  and	  the	  recipients	  of	  those	  programs,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
Welfare	  participation	  rates	  among	  immigrants	  
	   First,	  this	  relationship	  may	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
welfare	  system.	  In	  this	  scenario	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  based	  on	  the	  greater	  representation	  of	  immigrants	  as	  
recipients	  of	  welfare	  programs	  and	  a	  resulting	  perception	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Americans	  that	  immigrants	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  welfare	  system.	  If	  this	  describes	  the	  process,	  we	  would	  expect	  Americans	  to	  
connect	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  because	  they	  would	  
perceive	  welfare	  programs	  to	  be	  “immigrationized,”	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Gilens	  describes	  welfare	  
spending	  as	  “racialized.”	  	  The	  “immigratization”	  of	  welfare	  programs	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  Americans	  could	  
result	  in	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  Americans	  evaluations	  of	  immigration	  and	  immigrants,	  on	  one	  
hand,	  and	  their	  evaluations	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  on	  the	  other.	  
	   Of	  course,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  Americans	  to	  perceive	  inaccurately	  that	  immigrants	  are	  part	  of	  the	  welfare	  
system	  when,	  in	  fact,	  they	  are	  equally	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  participants	  in	  welfare	  programs.	  In	  the	  United	  
States,	  there	  indeed	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  overrepresentation	  of	  immigrants	  among	  the	  ranks	  of	  those	  in	  
poverty	  and	  in	  the	  welfare	  system.	  Immigrants	  living	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (and	  their	  U.S.-­‐born	  children)	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  living	  in	  poverty	  than	  native-­‐born	  Americans,	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  23.3%	  to	  13.5%	  (Camarota,	  
2012).	  While	  immigrants	  are	  roughly	  equally	  likely	  to	  receive	  cash	  assistance	  and	  housing	  subsidies	  as	  non-­‐
immigrants,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  food	  assistance	  and	  be	  recipients	  of	  Medicaid,	  and	  overall	  they	  
are	  more	  likely	  (by	  a	  margin	  of	  36.3%	  to	  22.8%)	  to	  receive	  “any	  welfare”	  than	  non-­‐immigrants.	  Moreover,	  
immigrants	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  the	  Earned	  Income	  Tax	  Credit	  (EITC)	  and	  the	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Additional	  Child	  Tax	  Credit	  (ACTC).	  For	  immigrants,	  29.7%	  are	  eligible	  for	  the	  EITC,	  compared	  to	  only	  14.5%	  
of	  non-­‐immigrants,	  though	  this	  program	  requires	  recipients	  to	  present	  a	  Social	  Security	  card;	  the	  ACTC	  
program	  does	  not	  require	  a	  Social	  Security	  card,	  and	  according	  to	  data	  from	  the	  CPS	  20.6%	  of	  immigrants	  
are	  eligible	  compared	  to	  only	  8.4%	  of	  non-­‐immigrants	  (Camarota,	  2012).2	  	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  
immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  broad	  panoply	  of	  programs	  falling	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  
“welfare	  state,”	  and	  this	  may	  contribute	  to	  Americans’	  perceptions	  that	  immigrants	  are	  part	  of	  the	  welfare	  
system.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  connection	  between	  Americans’	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  
and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
Immigrant	  stereotypes	  
	   A	  second	  possible	  source	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  Americans’	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  their	  
welfare	  attitudes	  is	  stereotypes	  toward	  immigrants.	  How	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigrants	  can	  have	  an	  
empirical	  component	  to	  it,	  but	  Americans	  may	  extend	  broad	  descriptive	  attributes	  of	  immigrants	  in	  
general	  toward	  specific	  groups	  of	  immigrants	  or	  individual	  immigrants.	  For	  instance,	  while	  immigrants	  may	  
be	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐immigrants	  to	  be	  participants	  in	  the	  welfare	  system,	  some	  Americans	  may	  
inaccurately	  perceive	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  welfare	  recipients	  are	  immigrants	  or	  else	  paint	  all	  or	  most	  
immigrants	  with	  the	  broad	  brush	  of	  being	  participants	  in	  the	  welfare	  system.	  	  
	   Further,	  some	  Americans	  may	  have	  stereotypes	  about	  immigrant	  groups	  that	  affect	  their	  
evaluations	  of	  immigrants	  and,	  hence,	  their	  perceptions	  of	  how	  deserving	  immigrants	  are	  of	  receiving	  
welfare	  benefits.	  Research	  examining	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  generic	  immigrant	  find	  remarkably	  consistent	  
results	  across	  countries;	  the	  dominant	  stereotype	  of	  immigrants	  is	  that	  they	  are	  incompetent	  and	  
untrustworthy	  (Cuddy,	  Fiske,	  Demoulin,	  and	  Leyens	  2000;	  Cuddy	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Lee	  and	  Fiske	  2006).	  	  
According	  to	  the	  stereotype	  content	  model,	  individuals	  attribute	  competence	  to	  those	  who	  they	  identify	  
as	  economically	  self-­‐reliant	  or	  successful	  and	  holding	  a	  prestigious	  job,	  whereas	  warmth	  or	  
trustworthiness	  is	  afforded	  to	  those	  perceived	  to	  be	  harmless	  or	  unable	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  in-­‐group	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for	  things	  like	  jobs,	  power,	  and	  resources	  (Fiske	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Fiske	  et	  al.	  1999).	  	  This	  prevailing	  stereotype	  
of	  the	  incompetent	  and	  untrustworthy	  immigrant	  is	  for	  some	  Americans	  the	  “go-­‐to”	  image	  for	  the	  
generic	  immigrant.	  	  According	  to	  work	  by	  Lee	  and	  Fiske	  (2006),	  individuals	  must	  be	  given	  additional	  
information	  in	  order	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  generic	  immigrant	  and	  call	  forth	  stereotypes	  that	  differ	  across	  
various	  immigrant	  groups.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  stereotype	  content	  model	  predicts	  that	  perceptions	  of	  
immigrants	  will	  vary	  only	  when	  individuals	  are	  given	  additional	  information,	  such	  as	  nation	  of	  origin	  
associated	  with	  the	  immigrant.	  	  	  
	   If	  the	  generic	  immigrant	  is	  seen	  by	  some	  or	  many	  Americans	  as	  incompetent	  and	  untrustworthy,	  can	  
that	  be	  linked	  to	  perceptions	  of	  welfare	  deservedness?	  	  In	  fact,	  scholars	  have	  examined	  the	  rank	  ordering	  
of	  deservingness	  among	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  find	  that	  immigrants	  are	  indeed	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  least	  
deserving	  (van	  Oorschot,	  2006).	  Among	  all	  welfare	  recipient	  groups,	  elderly	  people	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  
deserving,	  followed	  by	  sick	  and	  disabled	  people,	  and	  unemployed	  people,	  with	  immigrants	  deemed	  to	  be	  
the	  least	  deserving.	  This	  pattern	  is	  universal	  across	  men	  and	  women,	  individuals	  with	  different	  ages,	  
education,	  and	  income	  levels,	  and	  even	  across	  cultures	  and	  societies	  (van	  Oorschot,	  2006;	  van	  Oorschot,	  
1998;	  Appelbaum,	  2002).	  	  These	  stereotypical	  images	  of	  immigrants	  could	  possibly	  contribute	  to	  the	  
linkage	  between	  Americans’	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
Immigrant-­‐driven	  diversity	  
	   Alternatively,	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  could	  be	  due	  to	  
the	  higher	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  diversity	  that	  immigration	  brings	  and	  a	  resulting	  sense	  that	  individuals	  who	  
may	  be	  different	  in	  values,	  culture,	  behavior,	  or	  appearance	  are	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  government	  programs.	  
In	  homogenous	  societies,	  supporting	  an	  expanded	  welfare	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  of	  helping	  individuals	  
who	  are	  “like	  us”	  but	  who	  have	  perhaps	  run	  into	  a	  rough	  spell	  requiring	  government	  assistance.	  As	  the	  
diversity	  of	  a	  society	  increases,	  individuals	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  support	  welfare	  programs	  for	  others	  who	  are	  
not	  similar	  to	  themselves.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  immigrants	  are	  people	  who	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  violating	  standards	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of	  behavior	  that	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  past	  within	  a	  homogenous	  society,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  higher	  
diversity	  and	  perceived	  violations	  of	  behavioral	  norms	  immigrants	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  not	  being	  equally	  
deserving	  of	  government	  help.	  The	  result	  will	  be	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  how	  individuals	  evaluate	  
immigrants	  and	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state.	  	  
	   The	  bulk	  of	  the	  research	  in	  the	  American	  states	  clearly	  links	  increasing	  racial	  heterogeneity	  (i.e.	  
increasing	  black	  populations)	  with	  declining	  support	  for	  welfare	  programs	  (Miguel	  and	  Gugerty,	  2005;	  
Miguel	  1999;	  Hero	  and	  Preuhs	  2007;	  Habyarimana	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Gilens	  2003;	  Soss,	  Schram,	  Vartanian,	  and	  
O'Brien,	  2001;	  Banting	  and	  Kymlicka	  2005;	  Wolfe	  and	  Klausen	  1997).	  	  Using	  the	  American	  experience	  
with	  race	  and	  welfare	  as	  a	  foundation,	  comparative	  scholars	  have	  begun	  to	  examine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
increasing	  immigrant	  populations	  experienced	  by	  Europe	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  might	  lead	  to	  an	  
erosion	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  programs	  (Burgoon,	  Koster,	  and	  van	  Egmond,	  2010;	  Eger	  2010;	  Hjerm	  and	  
Schnabel	  2012;	  Larsen	  2011;	  Mau	  and	  Burkhardt	  2009;	  Sumino	  2013).	  	  According	  to	  Kymlicka	  and	  
Banting	  (2006,	  286)	  this	  position	  has	  even	  become	  dominant:	  	  “[T]he	  strongly	  racialized	  dimension	  of	  US	  
welfare	  politics	  is	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  an	  anomaly...but	  rather	  as	  a	  normal,	  even	  inevitable,	  reaction	  to	  the	  
simple	  fact	  of	  ethnic	  heterogeneity.	  Indeed,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  come	  to	  represent	  the	  leading	  
international	  example	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  heterogeneity	  as	  such	  erodes	  redistribution.”	  	  
	   Scholars	  in	  comparative	  politics	  tend	  to	  use	  racial	  heterogeneity	  and	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  
interchangeably.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  American	  case	  such	  conflation	  is	  inappropriate.	  	  Prior	  to	  
the	  debate	  and	  passage	  of	  the	  Personal	  Responsibility	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act	  (PWORA)	  in	  
1996,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	  relationship	  between	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  and	  welfare	  
attitudes.	  	  Under	  the	  Aid	  to	  Families	  with	  Dependent	  Children	  (AFCD)	  program,	  states	  such	  as	  New	  York	  
and	  California	  that	  contained	  the	  country’s	  largest	  ethnic	  populations	  also	  provided	  generous	  welfare	  
programs.	  The	  debate	  over	  PRWORA	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  the	  systematic	  exclusion	  of	  immigrations	  
from	  social	  safety	  net	  programs	  offers	  a	  hint	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethnicity	  and	  support	  for	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welfare	  might	  be	  changing	  in	  America.	  	  The	  unveiling	  of	  the	  Republican	  Contract	  with	  America	  in	  1994	  
formalized	  political	  plans	  for	  saving	  federal	  dollars	  through	  denying	  noncitizens	  access	  to	  programs;	  
moreover,	  the	  bipartisan	  support	  for	  PRWORA	  for	  these	  restrictions	  was	  striking	  (Singer	  2004).	  In	  
addition,	  even	  states	  with	  generous	  welfare	  benefits	  and	  large	  ethnic	  populations	  appear	  to	  have	  
“embraced	  the	  prevailing	  anti-­‐immigrant	  rhetoric”	  (Singer	  2004:26)	  	  	  For	  example,	  Hero	  (2010:	  462)	  
argues	  that	  the	  series	  of	  anti-­‐immigrant	  propositions	  passed	  in	  California	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  reflect	  
“stirred	  white	  resentments	  toward	  general	  egalitarian	  social	  policies	  and	  programs	  as	  well	  as	  programs	  
designed	  specifically	  for	  ethnoracial	  minorities.”	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  expected	  contraction	  of	  welfare	  
generosity	  associated	  with	  increased	  ethnic	  heterogeneity,	  similar	  to	  the	  contraction	  of	  welfare	  
generosity	  in	  response	  to	  increases	  in	  racial	  heterogeneity,	  might	  be	  muted	  in	  some	  instances.	  	  For	  
example,	  under	  TANF	  block	  grants	  for	  cash	  assistance,	  job	  training,	  and	  the	  like,	  states	  are	  subject	  to	  
maintenance	  of	  effort	  requirements	  that	  require	  states	  to	  maintain	  spending	  levels	  at	  a	  certain	  level	  
that	  might	  mute	  the	  expected	  contraction	  of	  generosity.	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  public	  opinion	  affects	  
policy	  outcomes,	  the	  contention	  that	  increased	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  might	  be	  associated	  with	  
decreased	  support	  for	  welfare	  rests	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  most	  recent	  wave	  of	  immigration	  to	  the	  U.S.	  
looks	  remarkably	  different	  than	  previous	  waves.	  	  Prior	  waves	  of	  immigration	  were	  dominated	  by	  
European	  immigrants,	  while	  today	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  foreign-­‐born	  individuals	  entering	  the	  U.S.	  are	  
from	  Asia,	  Africa,	  the	  Carribbean,	  Latin	  America	  or	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Hero	  2010).	  
	   In	  summary,	  we	  hypothesize	  that	  an	  individual’s	  attitude	  towards	  immigrants	  plays	  a	  substantial	  
role	  in	  contemporary	  support	  for	  the	  American	  welfare	  state.	  	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  welfare	  utilization	  
rates	  by	  immigrants,	  stereotypes	  of	  immigrants	  as	  incompetent,	  untrustworthy,	  and	  undeserving,	  or	  
immigrant-­‐driven	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  diversity.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism,	  the	  hypothesized	  
relationship	  remains	  the	  same:	  positive	  (negative)	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  immigration	  
correspond	  to	  increasing	  (decreasing)	  support	  for	  welfare.	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DATA	  AND	  METHODS	  
	   In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  relationship	  between	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  (i.e.,	  attitudes	  toward	  
legal	  immigration	  and	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants)	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  (i.e.,	  attitudes	  toward	  
welfare	  recipients	  and	  spending	  on	  welfare),	  we	  rely	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  
Election	  Study	  (CANES)	  surveys	  from	  1992	  to	  2012.	  Survey	  items	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  ANES	  surveys	  
about	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  since	  the	  1970s,	  but	  questions	  about	  immigration	  and	  welfare	  
spending	  are	  a	  more	  recent	  addition.	  We	  use	  1992	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  study	  to	  encompass	  years	  
that	  include	  variables	  representing	  welfare	  and	  immigration	  attitudes,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  range	  of	  relevant	  
control	  variables.	  	  
	   We	  use	  two	  variables	  as	  dependent	  variables	  in	  our	  models.	  First,	  we	  utilize	  data	  on	  individuals’	  affect	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients	  by	  including	  a	  feeling	  thermometer	  for	  welfare	  recipients,	  coded	  0	  for	  those	  
with	  strong	  negative	  affect,	  50	  representing	  the	  neutral	  position,	  and	  100	  for	  those	  with	  strong	  positive	  
affect.	  This	  variable	  captures	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  have	  positive	  or	  negative	  feelings	  toward	  
welfare	  recipients.	  Second,	  we	  use	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  an	  ordinal	  measure	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  
spending,	  coded	  1	  for	  respondents	  who	  support	  increases	  in	  welfare	  spending,	  0	  for	  those	  who	  would	  like	  
to	  keep	  welfare	  spending	  at	  current	  levels,	  and	  -­‐1	  for	  those	  who	  prefer	  decreases	  in	  welfare	  spending.	  	  
	   We	  include	  in	  our	  models	  a	  set	  of	  core	  independent	  variables	  that	  reflect	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  
immigrants.	  First,	  in	  five	  surveys	  (i.e.,	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012)	  the	  ANES	  includes	  a	  feeling	  
thermometer	  item	  for	  illegal	  immigrants;	  here	  again,	  this	  variable	  ranges	  from	  0	  (negative	  affect)	  to	  100	  
(positive	  affect).	  If	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  are	  related	  to	  welfare	  attitudes,	  we	  would	  expect	  
the	  coefficient	  for	  this	  variable	  to	  be	  positive.	  This	  would	  indicate	  that	  individuals	  who	  hold	  a	  positive	  view	  
toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  would	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  welfare	  programs;	  conversely,	  of	  course,	  this	  
would	  also	  indicate	  that	  individuals	  who	  hold	  negative	  views	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  would	  be	  less	  
supportive	  of	  welfare	  programs.	  Second,	  in	  seven	  surveys	  (i.e.,	  1992,	  1994,	  1996,	  2000,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	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2012)	  the	  ANES	  includes	  items	  relating	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  support	  increases	  in	  
immigration.	  This	  variable	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  respondents	  who	  support	  increased	  immigration,	  -­‐1	  for	  
respondents	  who	  support	  decreased	  immigration,	  and	  0	  for	  those	  who	  prefer	  keeping	  current	  levels	  of	  
immigration.	  The	  careful	  reader	  will	  note	  that	  no	  mention	  is	  made	  in	  this	  question	  to	  “illegal”	  immigration,	  
so	  this	  item	  can	  plausibly	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  reflecting	  respondents’	  preferences	  for	  general	  levels	  of	  
immigration.	  Here	  again,	  we	  expect	  the	  coefficient	  for	  this	  variable	  to	  be	  positive.	  Third,	  we	  also	  use	  
principal	  components	  factor	  analysis	  to	  create	  a	  scale	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  based	  on	  these	  two	  
immigration	  items.	  These	  two	  variables	  load	  strongly	  on	  a	  single	  factor	  representing	  individuals’	  general	  
immigration	  attitudes	  (eigenvalue	  =	  1.339,	  variance	  explained	  =	  0.670).	  Because	  values	  on	  both	  variables	  
are	  necessary	  to	  create	  this	  factor	  score,	  we	  can	  use	  this	  global	  measure	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  only	  for	  
the	  years	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012.	  	  	  
	   We	  also	  include	  in	  our	  model	  several	  other	  variables	  that	  could	  be	  related	  to	  welfare	  attitudes.	  First,	  
Gilens	  demonstrates	  that	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending	  are	  influenced	  by	  individuals’	  attitudes	  
toward	  blacks,	  so	  we	  include	  in	  our	  models	  a	  feeling	  thermometer	  variable	  for	  blacks.	  	  Moreover,	  because	  
welfare	  programs	  are	  designed	  for	  low-­‐income	  individuals	  in	  American	  society,	  we	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  
affect	  toward	  the	  poor,	  measured	  using	  the	  traditional	  feeling	  thermometer	  scale.	  We	  hypothesize	  that	  
the	  coefficients	  for	  each	  of	  these	  variables	  will	  be	  positive,	  indicating	  that	  individuals	  who	  hold	  favorable	  
attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  and	  the	  poor	  should	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  welfare.	  Second,	  individuals’	  attitudes	  
toward	  welfare	  programs	  are	  likely	  to	  reflect	  how	  they	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  government	  in	  our	  society.	  
These	  evaluations	  are	  reflected	  in	  partisan	  attachments	  and	  ideological	  orientations,	  so	  we	  include	  two	  
variables:	  (1)	  a	  seven-­‐point	  partisan	  identification	  scale,	  ranging	  from	  0	  (strong	  Democrat)	  to	  6	  (strong	  
Republican);	  and	  (2)	  political	  ideology,	  measured	  on	  a	  seven-­‐point	  scale	  ranging	  from	  0	  (strong	  liberal)	  to	  6	  
(strong	  conservative).	  We	  expect	  the	  coefficients	  for	  each	  variable	  to	  be	  negative,	  suggesting	  that	  
Republicans	  and	  conservatives	  will	  be	  the	  least	  favorable	  in	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare.	  Finally,	  we	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include	  in	  our	  models	  a	  series	  of	  demographic	  variables,	  including	  separate	  variables	  for	  black,	  Hispanic,	  
and	  Asian	  respondents,	  age,	  gender,	  education,	  family	  income,	  and	  church	  attendance.	  We	  hypothesize	  
that	  blacks,	  Hispanics,	  Asians,	  and	  women	  are	  more	  supportive	  of	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  welfare	  spending	  
than	  other	  individuals.	  We	  also	  suggest	  that	  older	  and	  high-­‐income	  individuals	  will	  be	  less	  favorably	  
oriented	  toward	  welfare,	  while	  those	  who	  are	  high	  in	  church	  attendance	  will	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  
welfare.	  Finally,	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  fluctuations	  in	  welfare	  attitudes	  that	  may	  vary	  systematically	  over	  time	  
and	  across	  states,	  we	  include	  fixed	  effects	  variables	  for	  each	  year	  and	  each	  state.	  In	  particular,	  the	  state	  
fixed	  effects	  variables	  capture	  the	  effects	  of	  state	  characteristics—e.g.,	  state	  welfare	  policies,	  demographic	  
attributes—that	  could	  affect	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes.	  	  
	   A	  description	  of	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  model	  assessing	  the	  relationship	  between	  attitudes	  
toward	  immigrants	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  welfare	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  I.	  	  	  
EMPIRICAL	  RESULTS	  
Affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  
	   In	  Table	  2	  we	  report	  the	  OLS	  regression	  coefficients	  for	  three	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients.	  Model	  (1)	  uses	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  factor	  score	  as	  the	  primary	  independent	  variable	  and	  is	  
based	  on	  five	  election	  years	  (since	  both	  of	  the	  component	  variables	  comprising	  the	  scale	  are	  available	  only	  
in	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012).	  	  In	  Model	  (2)	  we	  separate	  out	  the	  two	  component	  variables	  
comprising	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale;	  this	  permits	  us	  to	  provide	  separate	  estimates	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  affect	  
toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  and	  support	  for	  immigration	  on	  support	  for	  welfare	  recipients.	  Finally,	  in	  Model	  
(3)	  we	  drop	  the	  illegal	  immigrants	  feeling	  thermometer,	  and	  this	  permits	  us	  to	  estimate	  the	  model	  for	  
seven	  elections	  years.	  We	  estimate	  the	  third	  model	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  estimate	  the	  
model	  with	  a	  larger	  sample	  size	  and	  to	  cover	  more	  election	  years.	  
	   As	  one	  can	  see,	  immigration	  attitudes	  have	  a	  powerful	  effect	  on	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients.	  In	  Model	  (1)	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  factor	  score	  is	  positive	  and	  highly	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Table	  2.	  OLS	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  selected	  years	  (1992-­‐2012),	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	  	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	  	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	  	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4.744	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.07***	   	   	   	  	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  illegal	  immigrants	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.182	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.38***	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Support	  for	  immigration	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  2.018	   	   	  6.48***	  	   	   	   	  3.728	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.61***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.129	   	   	  6.32***	  	   	   	   	  0.113	   	   	  5.41***	  	   	   	   	  0.171	   	   	  8.63***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.390	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20.68***	  	   	   	   	  0.384	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.89***	  	   	   	   	  0.388	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23.63***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.803	   	   -­‐5.35***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.735	   	   -­‐4.98***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.994	   	   -­‐6.62***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.726	   	   -­‐4.55***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.664	   	   -­‐4.11***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.950	   	   -­‐6.24***	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.758	   	   	  1.88*	   	   	   	   	  0.541	   	   	  1.41	   	   	   	   	  0.417	   	   	  1.03	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2.523	   	   	  2.95**	   	   	   	   	  2.371	   	   	  2.89**	   	   	   	   	  2.789	   	   	  3.18**	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.500	   	   -­‐3.18**	   	   	   	   -­‐3.302	   	   -­‐4.15***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.437	   	   -­‐0.64	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.966	   	   	  0.46	   	   	   	   	  1.151	   	   	  0.55	   	   	   	   	  0.737	   	   	  0.40	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.199	   	   -­‐2.29*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.213	   	   -­‐2.46**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.189	   	   -­‐2.25*	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  2.90**	   	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  3.06**	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  2.92**	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.381	   	   	  1.55	   	   	   	   	  0.434	   	   	  1.76*	   	   	   	   	  0.709	   	   	  3.11**	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.564	   	   -­‐5.89***	  	   	   	   -­‐1.507	   	   -­‐5.82***	  	   	   	   -­‐1.620	   	   -­‐6.82***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.242	   	   	  1.88*	   	   	   	   	  0.216	   	   	  1.65*	   	   	   	   	  0.403	   	   	  2.96**	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐3.225	   	   -­‐5.03***	  	   	   	   -­‐3.495	   	   -­‐5.72***	  	   	   	   -­‐3.464	   	   -­‐5.34***	  
Survey	  year:	  1996	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.574	   	   	  0.70	  
Survey	  year:	  2000	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   -­‐0.629	   	   -­‐0.47	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1.383	   	   	  1.40	   	   	   	   	  1.264	   	   	  1.30	   	   	   	   	  1.797	   	   	  1.86	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.225	   	   	  0.35	   	   	   	   	  0.356	   	   	  0.57	   	   	   	   	  0.491	   	   	  0.82	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.517	   	   -­‐3.88***	  	   	   	   -­‐2.451	   	   -­‐3.87***	  	   	   	   -­‐2.328	   	   -­‐3.78***	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Table	  2	  (continued)	  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   9086	   	   	   	   	   	   	   9086	   	   	   	   	   	   10578	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.355	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.3620	   	   	   	   	   	   0.324	  
F	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   72.88	   	   	   	   	   	   	   74.44	   	   	   	   	   	   72.04	  
Prob	  (F)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  Models	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys;	  the	  estimates	  for	  Model	  (3)	  are	  based	  on	  
data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  1996,	  2000,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  baseline	  (excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  each	  model	  is	  1992.	  The	  expected	  
valence	  of	  the	  coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  state	  fixed	  effects	  are	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  
reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  	  
	  	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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significant	  (b	  =	  4.744,	  z	  =	  18.07).	  For	  every	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes,	  affect	  for	  
welfare	  recipients	  increases	  by	  almost	  5	  points.	  Moving	  across	  the	  full	  range	  of	  this	  variable	  from	  the	  
lowest	  value	  of	  -­‐1.49	  (representing	  strong	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment)	  to	  the	  highest	  value	  of	  2.63	  
(representing	  very	  positive	  views	  toward	  immigration),	  we	  would	  expect	  a	  predicted	  increase	  in	  feeling	  
thermometer	  scores	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  of	  almost	  20	  points	  (Δ	  =	  4.12	  *	  4.744	  =	  19.55).	  This	  is	  a	  very	  
strong	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  would	  seem	  to	  
underscore	  the	  connection	  that	  Americans	  are	  making	  between	  immigration	  and	  welfare. It is also worth 
noting that	  the	  standardized	  regression	  coefficient	  (β	  =	  0.219)	  is	  the	  second	  highest	  in	  the	  model,	  indicating	  
that	  this	  variable	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  most	  powerful	  predictors	  of	  welfare	  attitudes.	  
	   This	  strong	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  
results	  from	  Model	  (2),	  in	  which	  we	  estimate	  separately	  the	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  
and	  general	  support	  for	  immigration	  on	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.	  We	  find	  that	  
positive	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  positive	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients,	  holding	  constant	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  (b	  =	  0.182,	  t	  =	  13.38);	  individuals	  
who	  give	  illegal	  immigrants	  the	  most	  positive	  evaluations	  are	  predicted	  to	  score	  18.2	  points	  higher	  on	  the	  
feeling	  thermometer	  scale	  for	  welfare	  recipients	  than	  those	  who	  give	  illegal	  immigrants	  the	  most	  negative	  
evaluations.	  Moreover,	  general	  support	  for	  immigration	  has	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  evaluations	  of	  
welfare	  recipients	  (b	  =	  2.018,	  t	  =	  6.48);	  individuals	  who	  support	  increasing	  immigration	  give	  welfare	  
recipients	  a	  score	  on	  the	  feeling	  thermometer	  that	  is	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  4	  points	  higher	  than	  individuals	  who	  
prefer	  decreasing	  immigration.	  Note	  that	  these	  two	  significant	  effects	  occur	  with	  both	  variables	  in	  the	  
model.	  Arguably,	  since	  we	  include	  a	  measure	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigration	  in	  our	  model,	  the	  
coefficient	  for	  the	  general	  immigration	  variable	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  representing	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  effect	  of	  
attitudes	  toward	  legal	  immigration	  on	  welfare	  attitudes.	  We	  also	  note	  that	  the	  illegal	  immigrants	  feeling	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thermometer	  variable	  has	  the	  second	  highest	  standardized	  regression	  coefficient	  (β	  =	  0.216),	  suggesting	  
that	  its	  effect	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  surpasses	  those	  of	  almost	  all	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model.	  
	   We	  can	  also	  pick	  up	  additional	  observations	  by	  dropping	  from	  the	  model	  the	  illegal	  immigrants	  feeling	  
thermometer,	  which	  is	  available	  in	  the	  CANES	  data	  for	  only	  five	  elections.	  In	  Model	  (3)	  we	  estimate	  the	  
specific	  effect	  of	  general	  immigration	  attitudes	  for	  seven	  election	  surveys	  and	  an	  additional	  1,492	  
observations.	  Here	  again,	  we	  find	  that	  immigration	  attitudes	  have	  strong	  effects	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  
welfare	  recipients	  (b	  =	  3.728,	  t	  =	  13.61);	  this	  suggests	  that	  those	  who	  support	  increased	  (legal)	  immigration	  
are	  predicted	  to	  score	  7.46	  higher	  on	  the	  feeling	  thermometer	  for	  welfare	  recipients	  than	  those	  who	  
support	  decreasing	  immigration.	  Without	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants,	  
the	  coefficient	  for	  general	  immigration	  attitudes	  almost	  doubles	  in	  magnitude	  and	  is	  free	  to	  do	  more	  of	  
the	  heavy	  lifting	  in	  predicting	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.	  Although	  the	  total	  effect	  of	  this	  variable	  
on	  welfare	  attitudes	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  strong	  as	  that	  for	  the	  illegal	  immigrant	  feeling	  thermometer	  variable	  
in	  Model	  (2),	  it	  is	  still	  quite	  discernible	  and	  reinforces	  the	  general	  finding	  that	  immigration	  attitudes	  are	  
important	  determinants	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.	  	  
	   We	  find	  that	  across	  these	  three	  models	  the	  coefficients	  for	  the	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  are	  
generally	  consistent	  with	  expectations.	  Turning	  back	  to	  the	  results	  from	  Model	  (1),	  we	  find	  that	  both	  affect	  
for	  blacks	  (b	  =	  0.129,	  t	  =	  6.32)	  and	  affect	  for	  the	  poor	  (b	  =	  0.390,	  t	  =	  20.68)	  have	  strong	  effects	  on	  attitudes	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients	  that	  both	  are	  in	  the	  expected	  positive	  direction	  and	  well	  exceed	  conventional	  
levels	  of	  statistical	  significance.	  The	  variable	  representing	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	  has	  the	  strongest	  
effect	  of	  any	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  (β	  =	  0.357),	  which	  is	  approximately	  three	  times	  the	  effect	  of	  attitudes	  
toward	  blacks	  (β	  =	  0.126).	  As	  expected,	  we	  also	  find	  that	  partisan	  identification	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.803,	  t	  =	  -­‐5.35)	  and	  
political	  ideology	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.726,	  t	  =	  -­‐4.55)	  have	  significant	  negative	  effects	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients,	  and	  our	  findings	  also	  point	  to	  a	  strong	  negative	  effect	  of	  family	  income	  (b	  =	  -­‐1.564;	  t	  =	  -­‐5.89).	  
Regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  race,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  black	  respondents	  are	  more	  positively	  oriented	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toward	  welfare	  recipients	  (b	  =	  2.523,	  t	  =	  2.95),	  but	  Hispanic	  respondents	  are	  less	  favorable	  and	  Asian	  
respondents	  are	  no	  different	  than	  whites	  in	  how	  they	  think	  about	  welfare	  recipients.	  Finally,	  we	  find	  that	  
women	  and	  those	  who	  regularly	  attend	  church	  services	  are	  slightly	  more	  favorable	  in	  their	  attitudes	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  but	  that	  age	  has	  a	  negative	  (but	  nonlinear)	  effect.	  Surprisingly,	  we	  find	  little	  
effect	  of	  education	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  in	  Model	  (1),	  though	  the	  effect	  of	  education	  
reaches	  statistical	  significance	  in	  Models	  (2)	  and	  (3).	  
Support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  
	   What	  about	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending?	  	  In	  Table	  3	  we	  report	  ordered	  logit	  coefficients	  for	  three	  
models	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending;	  these	  models	  include	  the	  same	  independent	  variables	  from	  Table	  
2.	  For	  Model	  (1),	  we	  again	  find	  that	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  factor	  score	  variable	  has	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  
on	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  (b	  =	  0.326,	  t	  =	  12.07).	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  relationship	  can	  be	  
demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  2,	  in	  which	  we	  plot	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  outcomes	  on	  
the	  dependent	  variable	  across	  different	  values	  of	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  variable,	  all-­‐the-­‐while	  holding	  other	  
variables	  in	  the	  model	  constant	  at	  their	  means.	  As	  one	  can	  see,	  as	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  variable	  increases,	  
the	  probability	  that	  individuals	  support	  increased	  or	  maintained	  levels	  of	  welfare	  spending	  increases,	  while	  
the	  probability	  that	  individuals	  support	  decreases	  in	  welfare	  spending	  decreases	  as	  well.	  For	  instance,	  a	  
hypothetical	  individual	  who	  has	  strong	  negative	  immigration	  attitudes	  would	  be	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  
support	  decreased	  welfare	  spending	  (predicted	  probability	  =	  0.532)	  than	  an	  individual	  with	  strong	  positive	  
immigration	  attitudes	  (predicted	  probability	  =	  0.229);	  an	  individual	  who	  has	  strong	  positive	  immigration	  
attitudes	  would	  be	  most	  likely	  to	  keep	  welfare	  spending	  levels	  the	  same	  (predicted	  probably	  =	  0.526).	  The	  
predicted	  changes	  in	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending	  along	  the	  range	  of	  values	  on	  pro-­‐immigration	  
scale	  variable	  are	  considerable;	  indeed,	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model,	  
individuals	  who	  have	  the	  most	  negative	  feelings	  about	  immigration	  are	  a	  bit	  over	  0.30	  more	  likely	  to	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  (1)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.326	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.07***	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  illegal	  immigrants	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.009	   	   	  6.35***	  	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Support	  for	  immigration	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.254	   	   	  6.74***	  	   	   	   	  0.345	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.22***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002	   	   -­‐1.01	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002	   	   -­‐1.13	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.49	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.014	   	   	  7.44***	  	   	   	   	  0.014	   	   	  7.45***	  	   	   	   	  0.014	   	   	  8.68***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.145	   	   -­‐9.06***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.144	   	   -­‐8.76***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.156	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐10.75***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.273	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐10.99***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.272	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.10***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.284	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐12.55***	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.218	   	   	  3.47***	  	   	   	   	  0.214	   	   	  3.38***	  	   	   	   	  0.182	   	   	  3.23***	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.456	   	   	  5.38***	  	   	   	   	  0.453	   	   	  5.31***	  	   	   	   	  0.430	   	   	  5.32***	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.161	   	   	  1.85*	   	   	   	   	  0.147	   	   	  1.66*	   	   	   	   	  0.255	   	   	  3.98***	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.177	   	   	  0.76	   	   	   	   	  0.180	   	   	  0.78	   	   	   	   	  0.278	   	   	  1.34	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.10	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.06	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.07	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.05	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.02	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.05	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.064	   	   -­‐2.16*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.063	   	   -­‐2.13*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.056	   	   -­‐1.95	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.270	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.46***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.269	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.28***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.260	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.35***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.011	   	   -­‐0.74	   	   	   	   -­‐0.012	   	   -­‐0.77	   	   	   	   -­‐0.003	   	   -­‐0.19	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.361	   	   -­‐3.47***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.367	   	   -­‐3.57***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.353	   	   -­‐3.56***	  
Survey	  year:	  1996	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   -­‐0.682	   	   -­‐7.37***	  
Survey	  year:	  2000	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  0.02	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.460	   	   	  3.53***	  	   	   	   	  0.457	   	   	  3.51***	  	   	   	   	  0.499	   	   	  4.08***	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.561	   	   	  4.35***	  	   	   	   	  0.563	   	   	  4.36***	  	   	   	   	  0.562	   	   	  4.51***	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.228	   	   -­‐2.59**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.227	   	   -­‐2.58**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.201	   	   -­‐2.31*	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Table	  3	  (continued)	  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   9069	   	   	   	   	   	   	   9069	   	   	   	   	   	   	   10583	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.121	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.131	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.125	  
χ2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2411.35	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2413.67	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2645.11	  
Prob	  (χ2)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  Models	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys;	  the	  estimates	  for	  Model	  (3)	  are	  based	  on	  
data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  1996,	  2000,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  baseline	  (excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  each	  model	  is	  1992.	  The	  expected	  
valence	  of	  the	  coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  state	  fixed	  effects	  are	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  
reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  	  
	  	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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Figure	  2.	  Scatterplot	  of	  relationship	  between	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  and	  support	  for	  greater	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support	  a	  decrease	  in	  welfare	  spending	  than	  those	  who	  have	  the	  most	  positive	  feelings	  toward	  illegal	  
immigrants.	  	  
	   The	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  between	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigration	  and	  how	  
they	  think	  about	  welfare	  spending	  is	  reinforced	  in	  our	  empirical	  results	  from	  Models	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  in	  Table	  3.	  
Here	  we	  explore	  the	  separate	  effects	  of	  the	  component	  variables	  comprising	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  by	  
considering	  the	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  and	  general	  support	  for	  expanded	  
immigration	  on	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending.	  In	  Model	  (2)	  we	  show	  that	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  
immigrants	  (b	  =	  0.009,	  t	  =	  6.35)	  has	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending.	  	  We	  can	  plot	  
predicted	  probabilities	  for	  our	  three	  values	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  across	  values	  of	  these	  two	  
independent	  variables,	  holding	  constant	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  independent	  variables.	  In	  Figure	  3	  we	  show	  
how	  support	  for	  increased	  or	  maintained	  levels	  of	  welfare	  spending	  increases	  as individuals’	  attitudes	  
toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  shift	  in	  the	  positive	  direction,	  while	  the	  same	  shift	  results	  in	  a	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  
individuals’	  support	  for	  decreasing	  welfare	  spending.	  Almost	  50%	  of	  individuals	  with	  the	  most	  negative	  
views	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  decreasing	  welfare	  spending	  (predicted	  probability	  =	  0.496),	  
but	  this	  drops	  by	  0.207	  (to	  a	  predicted	  probability	  =	  0.289)	  for	  those	  with	  the	  most	  positive	  views	  toward	  
illegal	  immigrants.	  Further,	  only	  9%	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  most	  negative	  category	  are	  predicted	  to	  support	  
increased	  welfare	  spending.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  majority	  of	  those	  with	  the	  most	  positive	  views	  toward	  
illegal	  immigrants	  are	  predicted	  to	  support	  keeping	  welfare	  spending	  at	  current	  levels	  (predicted	  
probability	  =	  0.519),	  and	  almost	  20%	  of	  those	  in	  this	  group	  are	  predicted	  to	  support	  an	  increase	  (predicted	  
probability	  =	  0.192).	  Clearly,	  support	  for	  illegal	  immigration	  has	  a	  discernible	  effect	  on	  how	  Americans	  
think	  about	  welfare	  spending.	  	  
	   We	  also	  find	  that	  general	  support	  for	  expanded	  immigration	  has	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  support	  for	  welfare	  
spending,	  both	  in	  conjunction	  with	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  in	  Model	  (2)	  (b	  =	  0.254,	  t	  =	  6.74)	  
and	  in	  a	  model	  where	  the	  effect	  is	  estimated	  on	  its	  own	  in	  Model	  (3)	  (b	  =	  0.345,	  t	  =	  10.22).	  Clearly,	  the	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Figure	  3.	  Scatterplot	  of	  relationship	  between	  affect	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  and	  support	  for	  greater	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effect	  of	  support	  for	  expanded	  immigration	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  with	  or	  without	  controlling	  for	  the	  
effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants.	  Using	  the	  results	  from	  Model	  (2),	  in	  Figure	  4	  we	  plot	  how	  
predicted	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending	  change	  as	  individuals	  shift	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  increased	  
immigration.	  Although	  the	  coefficient	  support	  for	  expanded	  immigration	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  the	  
effect	  of	  this	  variable	  is	  somewhat	  muted	  in	  comparison	  to	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants.	  Shifting	  
from	  preferring	  decreased	  immigration	  to	  preferring	  increased	  immigration	  lowers	  preferences	  for	  
decreased	  spending	  on	  welfare	  by	  only	  about	  0.12	  (i.e.,	  from	  0.451	  to	  0.331),	  while	  support	  for	  increased	  
spending	  increases	  only	  by	  0.058	  (i.e.,	  from	  0.105	  to	  0.163)	  and	  support	  for	  keeping	  welfare	  spending	  the	  
same	  increases	  by	  	  0.062	  (i.e.,	  from	  0.444	  to	  0.506).	  These	  are	  discernible,	  nontrivial	  effects,	  but	  it	  does	  
represent	  a	  smaller	  effect	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants.	  	  
	   What	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model?	  	  Focusing	  on	  the	  results	  in	  Table	  3,	  Model	  (1),	  
we	  first	  find	  that	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	  has	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  
spending	  (b	  =	  0.014,	  t	  =	  7.44),	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  is	  reduced	  to	  statistical	  non-­‐
significance	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.002,	  t	  =	  -­‐1.01).	  As	  one	  can	  see	  from	  Figure	  5,	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  the	  three	  
categories	  of	  our	  welfare	  spending	  variable	  shift	  very	  little	  as	  one	  moves	  from	  the	  most	  negative	  to	  the	  
most	  positive	  views	  toward	  blacks.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  Figure	  6	  we	  see	  that	  shifts	  in	  affect	  toward	  the	  
poor	  have	  important	  effects	  on	  support	  for	  increased	  welfare	  spending	  (i.e.,	  predicted	  probabilities	  
shifting	  0.123,	  from	  0.050	  to	  0.173),	  keeping	  welfare	  spending	  the	  same	  (i.e.,	  0.217,	  from	  0.305	  to	  0.512),	  
and	  decreased	  welfare	  spending	  (i.e.,	  -­‐0.230,	  	  from	  0.645	  to	  0.315).	  These	  are	  very	  large	  effects	  that	  point	  
to	  the	  importance	  of	  Americans	  views	  about	  the	  poor	  in	  shaping	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending.	  
Finally,	  many	  of	  our	  control	  variables	  behave	  as	  expected.	  Support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  decreases	  as	  a	  
function	  of	  partisan	  identification,	  political	  ideology,	  education,	  and	  family	  income,	  but	  welfare	  spending	  
support	  is	  significantly	  higher	  among	  women,	  blacks,	  and	  Hispanics.	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Figure	  4.	  Scatterplot	  of	  relationship	  between	  support	  for	  expanded	  immigration	  and	  support	  for	  





	   	  
	  




















IncreaseDecrease Keep the Same  
Support for Increased Immigration
 29 
Figure	  5.	  Scatterplot	  of	  relationship	  between	  affect	  toward	  blacks	  and	  support	  for	  greater	  welfare	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Figure	  6.	  Scatterplot	  of	  relationship	  between	  affect	  toward	  the	  poor	  and	  support	  for	  greater	  welfare	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   In	  Appendix	  2	  we	  report	  the	  results	  for	  robustness	  tests	  relating	  to	  two	  issues:	  (1)	  endogeneity	  and	  
reciprocal	  causality	  issues;	  and	  (2)	  the	  stability	  of	  effects	  of	  immigrations	  attitudes	  across	  various	  groups.	  
Our	  findings	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  support	  for	  welfare	  stand	  up	  well	  
in	  these	  robustness	  tests.	  
SUMMARY	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  
	   In	  this	  paper	  we	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigration	  and	  how	  
they	  think	  about	  the	  welfare	  state.	  Scholars	  (cf.,	  Gilens,	  2000;	  Alesina,	  Baqir,	  and	  Easterly,	  1999)	  have	  
considered	  the	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  African	  Americans	  on	  support	  for	  welfare,	  and	  other	  scholars	  
have	  considered	  how	  racial	  and/or	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  resulting	  from	  increases	  in	  immigration	  has	  
reduced	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state,	  primarily	  in	  Western	  European	  countries	  (cf.,	  Burgoon,	  Koster,	  and	  
van	  Egmund	  2010;	  Eger	  2010;	  Hjerm	  and	  Schnabel	  2012).	  Here	  we	  focus	  explicitly	  on	  how	  individuals’	  
evaluation	  of	  illegal	  immigrants,	  their	  support	  for	  expanded	  immigration,	  and	  a	  general	  pro-­‐immigration	  
scale	  based	  on	  a	  factor	  analysis	  of	  these	  two	  items	  influences	  individuals’	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  
state.	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  1992-­‐2012	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Studies	  (CANES),	  we	  find	  
strong	  evidence	  to	  support	  our	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  linkage	  between	  individuals’	  immigration	  attitudes	  
and	  their	  welfare	  attitudes.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  remains	  
even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  statistical	  controls	  and	  our	  effort	  to	  account	  for	  possible	  endogeneity	  
between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes,	  and	  further	  this	  effect	  is	  observed	  in	  our	  general	  
sample	  of	  the	  population,	  among	  white	  survey	  respondents,	  among	  both	  immigrant	  and	  non-­‐immigrant	  
families,	  and	  in	  the	  periods	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  1996	  welfare	  reform	  act	  (PRWORA).	  Our	  findings	  are	  
robust	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  conditions	  and	  model	  specifications.	  	  
	   We	  are	  particularly	  struck	  by	  the	  relative	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  in	  shaping	  
welfare	  attitudes,	  particularly	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  variables	  that	  have	  long	  been	  seen	  as	  
important	  determinants	  of	  welfare	  attitudes.	  An	  examination	  of	  standardized	  regression	  coefficients	  and	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patterns	  of	  predicted	  probabilities	  reveals	  that	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	  have	  arguably	  the	  strongest	  
effect	  on	  welfare	  attitudes,	  as	  one	  might	  expect.	  However,	  what	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  
attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  are	  stronger	  than	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  and	  other	  
variables	  such	  as	  partisan	  identification,	  political	  ideology,	  and	  even	  family	  income.	  	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  would	  
appear	  that	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigration	  and	  immigrants	  is	  a	  major	  component	  of	  how	  they	  
think	  about	  welfare,	  even	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  variables	  found	  to	  have	  important	  
influences	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  in	  previous	  studies.	  
	   Where	  do	  we	  go	  from	  here?	  	  We	  suggest	  that	  the	  research	  agenda	  on	  the	  linkage	  between	  
immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  is	  a	  full	  one.	  First,	  more	  research	  should	  be	  done	  using	  
alternative	  measures	  of	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state.	  We	  have	  focused	  our	  attention	  on	  support	  for	  
welfare	  spending,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  welfare	  recipients,	  but	  there	  are	  other	  welfare	  
state	  variables—including	  support	  for	  spending	  on	  specific	  welfare	  programs—that	  warrant	  study.	  For	  
instance,	  are	  Americans	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  other	  government	  programs	  within	  the	  broad	  category	  of	  
“welfare”	  programs	  as	  a	  function	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration?	  	  We	  have	  noted	  that	  immigrants	  and	  
non-­‐immigrants	  are	  about	  equally	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  TANF,	  SSI,	  and	  state	  cash	  assistance	  programs,	  
but	  immigrants	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  food	  assistance	  programs	  and	  Medicaid.	  It	  is	  
worth	  exploring	  whether	  or	  not	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  only	  influence	  support	  for	  food	  stamps	  and	  
Medicaid,	  but	  not	  other	  programs.	  If	  so,	  it	  provides	  support	  for	  our	  speculation	  that	  it	  is	  immigrants’	  
welfare	  participation	  that	  triggers	  the	  linkage	  between	  immigrant	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes.	  
However,	  if	  immigrant	  attitudes	  influence	  public	  support	  for	  all	  types	  of	  welfare	  programs,	  the	  linkage	  
between	  immigrant	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  might	  very	  likely	  be	  due	  to	  general	  ideology,	  
misperceptions,	  stereotypes,	  and/or	  prejudice.	  	  
	   Second,	  it	  is	  arguably	  the	  case	  that	  we	  need	  better	  measures	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  immigration	  in	  order	  
to	  understand	  the	  operational	  causal	  mechanism	  better.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  it	  is	  “stereotypes	  and	  prejudice”	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of	  immigrants	  that	  renders	  public	  support	  for	  welfare,	  it	  is	  theoretically	  interesting	  to	  identify	  what	  exact	  
kind	  of	  stereotype	  most	  effectively	  reduces	  support	  for	  welfare.	  Furthermore,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  need	  data	  
on	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  illegal	  or	  undocumented	  immigrants,	  but	  we	  also	  need	  more	  specific	  data	  
on	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  immigrants	  who	  are	  in	  the	  United	  States	  legally,	  including	  permanent	  
residents	  and	  naturalized	  U.S.	  citizens.	  Do	  Americans	  think	  differently	  about	  immigrants	  who	  are	  here	  
illegally	  and	  immigrants	  who	  are	  here	  as	  permanent	  residents	  or	  who	  have	  earned	  citizenship?	  	  Does	  how	  
Americans	  think	  about	  these	  groups	  affect	  how	  they	  think	  about	  the	  welfare	  state?	  	  	  Does	  how	  Americans	  
think	  about	  citizens	  who	  are	  black,	  Hispanic,	  white,	  Asian,	  or	  of	  other	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  backgrounds	  affect	  
their	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  welfare	  state?	  	  	  	  
	   Third,	  we	  have	  not	  explored	  in	  this	  paper	  the	  effects	  of	  context,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  crucial	  next	  step	  toward	  
developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  linkage	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  
welfare	  system.	  One	  argument	  about	  why	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  should	  be	  linked	  is	  
that	  immigrants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  welfare	  system.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  
relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes,	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  survey	  
respondents	  from	  those	  geographic	  areas	  in	  which	  immigrants	  are	  overrepresented	  among	  welfare	  
recipients	  to	  exhibit	  the	  strongest	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes;	  in	  
these	  contexts,	  welfare	  is	  “immigrationized,”	  and	  individuals	  residing	  in	  those	  areas	  should	  connect	  their	  
attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  to	  their	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state.	  This	  should	  particularly	  be	  the	  case	  for	  
individuals	  who	  are	  heavy	  news	  media	  users	  and	  who	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  political	  sophistication;	  these	  
individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  least	  roughly	  cognizant	  of	  welfare	  utilization	  rates	  among	  immigrants	  
and	  nonimmigrants.	  Moreover,	  scholars	  have	  explored	  the	  effects	  of	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  on	  
support	  for	  welfare	  programs,	  and	  including	  contextual	  data	  on	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  would	  
seem	  to	  be	  an	  important	  next	  step	  in	  studying	  how	  immigration	  attitudes	  are	  related	  to	  welfare	  attitudes.	  
In	  particular,	  if	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  sensitizes	  individuals	  to	  out-­‐groups	  and	  their	  potentially	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greater	  participation	  rates	  in	  welfare	  programs,	  one	  might	  expect	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  
welfare	  attitudes	  to	  be	  of	  stronger	  magnitude	  in	  contexts	  characterized	  by	  high	  heterogeneity	  than	  in	  
homogeneous	  contexts.	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ENDNOTES	  
1.	   Federal	  law	  prohibits	  immigrants	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  less	  than	  five	  years	  from	  receiving	  federal	  
funds	  from	  the	  Temporary	  Assistance	  for	  Needy	  Families	  (TANF)	  program,	  though	  states	  may	  use	  
their	  own	  funds	  for	  this	  subpopulation;	  what	  this	  means	  is	  that	  one	  would	  expect	  participation	  by	  
immigrants	  in	  this	  traditional	  “welfare”	  program	  to	  be	  relatively	  low.	  The	  CPS	  data	  compiled	  by	  
Camarota	  (2012)	  reveal	  that	  immigrants	  are	  approximately	  equally	  likely	  to	  be	  recipients	  of	  “cash	  
assistance,”	  a	  category	  that	  includes	  TANF	  benefits	  (for	  immigrants	  residing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  
more	  than	  five	  years),	  Supplemental	  Security	  Income	  (SSI),	  and	  state	  general	  assistance	  (for	  which	  
immigrants	  are	  eligible	  only	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  their	  state	  of	  residence).	  	  
2.	   Note	  that	  these	  figures	  represent	  eligibility,	  and	  not	  receipt	  of	  the	  program.	  There	  are	  many	  
individuals	  who	  are	  eligible	  for	  the	  EITC	  and	  ACTC	  but	  who	  do	  not	  avail	  themselves	  of	  these	  
programs.	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Appendix	  1.	  Description	  of	  Variables	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Description	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  welfare	  recipients	  	   	   	   Feeling	  thermometer	  for	  welfare	  recipients:	  100	  =	  strong	  
positive	  affect;	  .	  .	  .;	  0	  =	  strong	  negative	  affect.	  
	  
Support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  (CANES)	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  supports	  increases	  in	  welfare	  spending;	  0	  =	  
respondent	  supports	  keeping	  welfare	  spending	  the	  same;	  -­‐1	  =	  
respondent	  supports	  decreases	  in	  welfare	  spending.	  
	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  illegal	  immigrants	  	   	   	   Feeling	  thermometer	  for	  illegal	  immigrants:	  100	  =	  strong	  
positive	  affect;	  .	  .	  .;	  0	  =	  strong	  negative	  affect.	  
	  
Support	  for	  immigration	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  supports	  increased	  immigration;	  0	  =	  
respondent	  supports	  keeping	  immigration	  at	  current	  levels;	  -­‐1	  
=	  respondent	  supports	  decreased	  immigration.	  
	  
Pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Scale	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  based	  on	  principle	  components	  
factor	  analysis	  of	  feeling	  thermometer	  for	  illegal	  immigrations	  
and	  support	  for	  immigration.	  (Eigenvalue	  =	  1.339,	  variance	  
explained	  =	  0.670.)	  
	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	   	   	   	   	   	   Feeling	  thermometer	  for	  blacks	  or	  African	  Americans:	  100	  =	  
strong	  positive	  affect;	  .	  .	  .;	  0	  =	  strong	  negative	  affect.	  
	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  	   	   	   	   	   Feeling	  thermometer	  for	  the	  poor:	  100	  =	  strong	  positive	  affect;	  
.	  .	  .;	  0	  =	  strong	  negative	  affect.	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7-­‐point	  partisan	  identification	  scale:	  6	  =	  respondent	  is	  a	  strong	  
Republican;	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  0	  =	  respondent	  is	  a	  strong	  Democrat.	  
	  
Political	  ideology	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7-­‐point	  scale	  of	  liberal-­‐conservative	  ideology:	  6	  =	  respondent	  is	  
a	  strong	  conservative;	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  0	  =	  respondent	  is	  a	  strong	  liberal.	  
	  
Female	  respondent	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  is	  a	  female;	  0	  =	  respondent	  is	  a	  male.	  
	  
Black	  respondent	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  is	  black	  or	  African	  American;	  0	  =	  otherwise.	  
	  
Hispanic	  respondent	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  is	  Hispanic	  or	  Latino;	  0	  =otherwise.	  
	  
Asian	  respondent	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  is	  Asian;	  0	  =	  otherwise.	  
	  
Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7	  =	  respondent	  has	  post-­‐graduate	  degree;	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  1	  =	  respondent	  
has	  less	  than	  a	  high	  school	  degree	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Appendix	  1	  (continued)	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Description	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Family	  income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   5-­‐point	  family	  income	  scale:	  5	  =	  respondent	  is	  in	  top	  5%	  of	  
income	  distribution;	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  1	  =	  respondent	  is	  in	  bottom	  one-­‐sixth	  
of	  income	  distribution.	  
	  
Age	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Respondent	  age	  (in	  years)	  
	  
Church	  attendance	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4	  =	  respondent	  attends	  church	  services	  more	  than	  once	  a	  
week;	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  0	  =	  respondent	  never	  attends	  church	  services.	  
	  
Warrant	  for	  wiretaps	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  favors	  the	  U.S.	  government	  being	  required	  to	  
present	  evidence	  to	  get	  a	  court’s	  permission	  before	  it	  can	  listen	  
in	  on	  phone	  calls	  made	  by	  American	  citizens	  who	  are	  suspected	  
of	  being	  terrorists;	  0	  =	  respondent	  neither	  supports	  or	  
opposes;	  -­‐1	  =	  respondent	  opposes	  warrant	  requirement.	  
	  
Limits	  on	  foreign	  imports	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  =	  respondent	  favors	  limits	  on	  foreign	  imports;	  0	  =	  respondent	  
has	  not	  thought	  much	  about	  this	  matter;	  -­‐	  1	  =	  respondent	  
opposes	  limits	  on	  foreign	  imports.	  
	  
Immigration	  takes	  away	  jobs	   	   	   	   	   	   3	  =	  respondent	  perceives	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  likely	  that	  recent	  
immigration	  levels	  will	  take	  away	  jobs	  from	  people	  already	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APPENDIX	  2:	  ROBUSTNESS	  TESTS	  
	   Our	  empirical	  results	  thus	  far	  provide	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  assertion	  that	  immigration	  attitudes	  
matter	  for	  welfare	  attitudes.	  Individuals	  who	  adopt	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  are	  significantly	  more	  
favorable	  in	  their	  evaluations	  of	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  in	  their	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending;	  conversely,	  of	  
course,	  individuals	  who	  express	  anti-­‐immigration	  views	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  hold	  less	  favorable	  views	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients	  or	  express	  less	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending.	  This	  immigration	  effect	  is	  also	  
observed	  for	  each	  of	  the	  specific	  immigration	  items	  that	  comprise	  our	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale.	  Individuals	  
who	  express	  negative	  affect	  toward	  illegal	  immigrants	  and/or	  who	  support	  decreased	  levels	  of	  
immigration	  are	  significantly	  less	  favorable	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  welfare	  spending	  than	  others.	  
Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  Americans	  link	  their	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  their	  welfare	  attitudes.	  In	  this	  
section	  we	  consider	  possible	  limitations	  or	  alternative	  explanations	  for	  our	  findings	  and	  offer	  a	  series	  of	  
tests	  of	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  core	  findings.	  
Endogeneity	  and	  Reciprocal	  Causality	  Issues	  
	   Although	  our	  results	  suggest	  a	  strong	  positive	  relationship	  between	  immigrant	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  
attitudes,	  a	  plausible	  counter-­‐argument	  is	  that	  this	  relationship	  is	  endogenous	  and	  that	  the	  observed	  
relationship	  actually	  flows	  from	  welfare	  attitudes	  to	  immigrant	  attitudes,	  and	  not	  (as	  we	  suggest)	  the	  
other	  way	  around.	  Our	  theory	  has	  suggested	  why	  and	  how	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  influence	  
individuals’	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  and	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.	  Yet	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  the	  causal	  arrow	  is	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction—i.e.,	  individuals’	  welfare	  attitudes	  affect	  their	  
attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  and	  immigration.	  For	  instance,	  individuals	  who	  have	  strong	  antagonism	  
toward	  welfare	  programs	  may	  express	  negative	  sentiments	  against	  anyone	  who	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  
heavy	  users	  of	  those	  programs.	  Insofar	  as	  individuals	  may	  perceive	  that	  immigrants	  are	  overrepresented	  
in	  the	  welfare	  system,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  to	  see	  that	  how	  Americans	  think	  about	  welfare	  will	  
shape	  their	  immigration	  attitudes.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	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immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  that	  we	  observe	  here	  is	  really	  an	  artifact	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  
causation	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  A	  statistical	  model	  that	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  possibility	  of	  
endogeneity	  could	  lead	  to	  biased	  estimates	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  immigrant	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes.	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  endogeneity	  issue,	  we	  use	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares	  estimation	  with	  
instrumental	  variables	  (IV-­‐2SLS)	  (Woolridge,	  2012;	  Gujarati	  and	  Porter,	  2012).	  	  Using	  this	  instrumental	  
model	  approach	  appropriately	  allows	  us	  to	  estimate	  the	  independent	  effect	  of	  immigrant	  attitudes	  on	  
welfare	  attitudes,	  without	  the	  concern	  that	  welfare	  attitudes	  are	  unduly	  influencing	  our	  model	  
estimates.	  The	  IV-­‐2SLS	  approach	  purges	  the	  endogenous	  component	  from	  our	  independent	  variable	  
immigrant	  attitudes,	  and	  then	  we	  are	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  purged	  (or	  instrumented)	  
independent	  variable	  continues	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (Baum,	  Schaffer	  
and	  Stillman	  2007).	  The	  IV-­‐2SLS	  technique	  requires	  us	  to	  identify	  instruments	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  
the	  endogenous	  immigrant	  attitudes	  variable	  but	  remain	  independently	  unrelated	  to	  welfare	  attitudes,	  
once	  accounting	  for	  the	  other	  independent	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  (Woolridge,	  2012;	  Gujarati	  and	  
Porter;	  2012;	  Best	  and	  Krueger	  2011;	  Hutchison	  2014).	  The	  IV-­‐2SLS	  technique	  permits	  us	  to	  disentangle	  
the	  causal	  mechanism	  in	  two	  stages.	  In	  the	  first-­‐stage	  model	  the	  endogenous	  independent	  variable	  
(immigrant	  attitudes)	  is	  modelled	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  other	  independent	  control	  
variables;	  in	  the	  second-­‐stage	  model	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (welfare	  attitudes)	  is	  modelled	  as	  a	  
function	  of	  the	  instrumented	  immigrant	  attitudes	  variable	  and	  the	  control	  variables.	  To	  be	  confident	  in	  a	  
2SLS	  result	  requires	  three	  conditions:	  (1)	  the	  instruments	  must	  effectively	  predict	  the	  endogenous	  
independent	  variable	  and	  independently	  account	  for	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  first-­‐
stage	  model;	  (2)	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term	  of	  the	  second-­‐stage	  model	  should	  be	  orthogonal—
i.e.,	  the	  excluded	  instruments	  should	  not	  independently	  predict	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  second	  
stage	  model	  once	  controlling	  for	  the	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model,	  and	  (3)	  the	  instrumented	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independent	  variable	  should	  	  continue	  to	  exhibit	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (Baum,	  
Schaffer	  and	  Stillman	  2007;	  Woolridge,	  2012;	  Gujarati	  and	  Porter,	  2012).	  	  
	   Our	  search	  for	  variables	  that	  meet	  the	  tests	  for	  appropriate	  instrumental	  variables	  presents	  a	  
difficult	  challenge	  using	  data	  from	  the	  CANES.	  This	  is	  a	  general	  data	  set	  that	  does	  not	  include	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  possible	  instruments	  for	  immigration	  attitudes,	  and	  possible	  instrumental	  variables	  are	  
available	  in	  some	  years	  but	  not	  in	  others.	  Fortunately,	  the	  2012	  American	  National	  Election	  Survey	  
(ANES)	  includes	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  potential	  instruments.	  Following	  the	  general	  rules	  of	  the	  IV-­‐2SLS	  
approach,	  we	  have	  identified	  three	  variables	  as	  exogenous	  (or	  excluded)	  instruments	  that	  have	  no	  prior	  
theoretical	  connections	  with	  welfare	  attitudes:	  (1)	  support	  for	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  government	  be	  
required	  to	  obtain	  a	  warrant	  to	  authorize	  wiretapping	  of	  phone	  calls	  by	  American	  citizens	  who	  are	  
suspected	  of	  being	  terrorists;	  (2)	  support	  for	  limits	  on	  foreign	  imports;	  and	  (3)	  degree	  of	  agreement	  with	  
the	  assertion	  that	  immigrants	  take	  away	  jobs	  from	  “people	  already	  here.”	  Given	  the	  availability	  of	  
appropriate	  instruments,	  we	  conduct	  our	  IV-­‐2SLS	  analyses	  using	  data	  from	  the	  2012	  ANES.	  The	  results	  
from	  the	  IV-­‐2SLS	  analyses	  indicate	  that	  our	  immigration	  attitudes	  variables	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  
welfare	  attitudes	  even	  after	  we	  consider	  possible	  endogeneity.	  The	  2012	  results	  give	  us	  confidence	  that	  
immigration	  attitudes	  should	  have	  a	  similar	  effect	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  in	  our	  analyses	  of	  CANES	  data.
	   In	  the	  first	  stage	  we	  estimate	  a	  model	  that	  depicts	  our	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  
three	  instrumental	  variables	  as	  well	  as	  the	  various	  control	  variables	  from	  our	  original	  models.	  The	  
predicted	  values	  represent	  an	  instrumented	  measure	  of	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  that	  is	  purged	  of	  the	  
influence	  of	  welfare	  attitudes.	  We	  then	  use	  the	  purged	  (or	  instrumented)	  immigrant	  attitude	  variable	  to	  
predict	  our	  two	  dependent	  variables:	  (1)	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients;	  and	  (2)	  support	  for	  welfare	  
spending.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  two	  dependent	  variables,	  we	  estimate	  the	  first	  stage	  model	  with	  the	  same	  set	  
of	  instruments.	  In	  Model	  (1),	  Appendix	  Table	  2.1	  we	  display	  the	  results	  for	  the	  second-­‐stage	  model	  
when	  we	  use	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  while	  Model	  (2)	  in	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Appendix	  Table	  2.1	  we	  present	  the	  results	  for	  the	  second-­‐stage	  model	  when	  we	  use	  support	  for	  welfare	  
spending	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Results	  for	  the	  first-­‐stage	  models	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  Table	  
2.2.	  
	   We	  have	  conducted	  two	  diagnostic	  tests	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  our	  instruments	  are	  valid.	  	  
First,	  we	  use	  the	  Stock-­‐Yogo	  weak	  identification	  test	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  three	  
instruments	  can	  sufficiently	  predict	  the	  endogenous	  independent	  variable,	  our	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  
(Stock	  and	  Yogo	  2005).	  The	  Cragg-­‐Donald	  F	  statistic	  we	  have	  obtained	  is	  427.56	  for	  Model	  (1)	  (where	  
affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable)	  and	  1011.80	  for	  Model	  (2)	  (where	  support	  
for	  welfare	  spending	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable),	  both	  of	  which	  far	  exceed	  the	  Stock-­‐Yogo	  weak	  ID	  test	  
critical	  value	  9.08	  (Stock	  and	  Yogo	  2005;	  Baum	  Schaffer	  and	  Stillman	  2007).	  The	  partial	  R2	  values	  offer	  an	  
intuitive	  corroboration	  of	  these	  formal	  tests	  that	  the	  excluded	  instruments	  strongly	  predict	  immigration	  
attitudes.	  The	  three	  excluded	  instruments	  alone	  contribute	  to	  0.2195	  toward	  the	  overall	  R2	  of	  0.3825	  in	  
the	  first	  stage	  model	  when	  we	  use	  “affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients”	  as	  the	  DV	  (see	  Model	  1	  of	  
Appendix	  Table	  2.2).The	  same	  three	  excluded	  instruments	  also	  contributed	  to	  0.2214	  toward	  the	  overall	  
R2	  of	  0.3838	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  model	  when	  “support	  for	  welfare	  spending”	  is	  used	  as	  our	  DV	  (see	  Model	  
2	  of	  Appendix	  2.2).	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  our	  instruments	  are	  weak.	  
	   In	  the	  second	  test,	  we	  assess	  the	  possibility	  that	  our	  excluded	  instruments	  can	  predict	  the	  error	  
terms	  from	  our	  second-­‐stage	  models	  and	  thus	  suggest	  that	  they	  independently	  relate	  to	  the	  dependent	  
variables;	  the	  Sargan	  statistic	  serves	  this	  purpose	  (Sargan	  1988;	  Baum,	  Schaffer	  and	  Stillman	  2003;	  
Baum,	  Schaffer	  and	  Stillman	  2007).	  The	  Sargan	  statistic	  for	  Model	  (1)	  (with	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients	  as	  our	  dependent	  variable)	  is	  0.879	  (p	  =	  0.6442),	  which	  does	  not	  approach	  conventional	  levels	  
of	  statistical	  significance	  (p	  <	  0.05).	  In	  Model	  (2),	  with	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  as	  our	  dependent	  
variable,	  the	  Sargan	  statistic	  is	  0.230	  (p	  =	  0.9370),	  which	  also	  does	  not	  meet	  standard	  thresholds	  for	  
statistical	  significance.	  Given	  these	  results,	  we	  have	  little	  confidence	  that	  the	  excluded	  instruments	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could	  predict	  the	  second-­‐stage	  models’	  error	  terms.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  excluded	  instruments	  can	  be	  
safely	  left	  out	  of	  the	  second	  stage	  models,	  as	  they	  would	  not	  independently	  predict	  welfare	  spending	  
attitudes	  or	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients.	  	  
	   Finally,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  our	  results	  in	  Appendix	  Table	  2.1	  show	  that	  the	  purged	  (or	  
instrumented)	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  still	  has	  the	  expected	  positive	  effect	  on	  each	  of	  the	  two	  dependent	  
variables.	  In	  Model	  (1),	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  instrumented	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  (b=	  6.414,	  t	  =	  6.28)	  is	  
positive	  and	  far	  surpasses	  conventional	  levels	  of	  statistical	  significance,	  indicating	  that	  immigration	  
attitudes	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  even	  when	  we	  control	  for	  
endogeneity.	  After	  accounting	  for	  possible	  endogeneity,	  we	  still	  find	  that	  individuals	  who	  hold	  more	  
favorable	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  (and	  immigration)	  remain	  significantly	  and	  strongly	  more	  likely	  to	  
have	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  welfare	  recipients.	  Moving	  to	  Model	  (2),	  we	  find	  that	  the	  instrumented	  
immigrant	  attitudes	  variable	  (b	  =	  0.158,	  t	  =	  4.53)	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  significant	  effect	  on	  support	  for	  
welfare	  spending,	  meaning	  that	  even	  after	  accounting	  for	  possible	  endogeneity	  individuals	  holding	  more	  
favorable	  attitudes	  toward	  immigrants	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  welfare	  spending.	  	  
	   Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  show	  strong	  support	  for	  a	  causal	  arrow	  that	  leads	  from	  pro-­‐
immigrant	  attitudes	  to	  welfare	  attitudes.	  How	  Americans	  think	  of	  immigration	  continues	  to	  have	  a	  
strong,	  independent	  effect	  on	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  their	  support	  for	  welfare	  
spending	  in	  the	  United	  States	  even	  after	  we	  account	  for	  endogeneity.	  	  
Stability	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  effects	  across	  groups	  
	   Another	  possible	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  strong	  effects	  of	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  
may	  vary	  across	  groups	  or	  contexts.	  While	  we	  have	  found	  strong	  evidence	  of	  a	  linkage	  between	  
immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  the	  general	  population,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  
groups	  are	  especially	  likely	  to	  link	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  variables,	  while	  others	  do	  not	  make	  this	  connection	  at	  
all	  or	  do	  so	  very	  weakly.	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   White-­‐only	  effect?	  	  One	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  
attitudes	  may	  be	  particularly	  strong	  among	  white	  Americans,	  who	  are	  themselves	  somewhat	  
underrepresented	  in	  the	  welfare	  system	  and	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  welfare	  program	  participants—
particularly	  those	  in	  racial,	  ethnic,	  and	  immigration	  minority	  groups—as	  less	  deserving.	  	  Hence	  one	  might	  
expect	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  will	  be	  particularly	  
strong	  among	  whites.	  In	  Appendix	  Table	  2.3	  we	  present	  estimates	  of	  our	  models	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  
welfare	  recipients	  and	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending,	  estimated	  separately	  for	  white	  respondents	  only.	  As	  
one	  can	  see,	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  has	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  both	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  
recipients	  (b	  =	  4.647,	  t	  =	  17.21)	  and	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  (b	  =	  0.367,	  t	  =	  10.88).	  We	  are	  struck	  by	  
how	  the	  coefficients	  for	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale	  are	  of	  similar	  magnitudes	  in	  our	  white-­‐only	  sample	  and	  
our	  all-­‐respondents	  sample	  from	  Model	  (1),	  Table	  2	  and	  Model	  (1),	  Table	  3,	  respectively.	  It	  would	  appear	  
that	  the	  strong	  effect	  of	  immigration	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  is	  not	  diminished	  in	  the	  sample	  of	  only	  
white	  respondents.	  
	   We	  also	  conduct	  the	  same	  endogeneity	  IV-­‐2SLS	  tests	  for	  white	  respondents	  only.	  Our	  results	  show	  
strong	  support	  for	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  between	  immigrant	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  despite	  the	  
endogeneity	  issue	  for	  white	  respondents	  only.	  Results	  for	  whites	  only	  for	  the	  second	  and	  first	  stages	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  Tables	  2.4	  and	  2.5,	  respectively.	  
	   Immigrant	  and	  non-­‐immigrant	  families.	  A	  second	  source	  of	  possible	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  
immigration	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  can	  arise	  from	  possible	  differences	  between	  those	  in	  immigrant	  
and	  native-­‐born	  families.	  We	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  individuals	  from	  native-­‐born	  families—i.e.,	  those	  
in	  which	  both	  parents	  were	  born	  in	  the	  United	  States—will	  be	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  their	  immigrant	  
attitudes	  in	  shaping	  their	  views	  toward	  welfare.	  In	  Appendix	  Table	  2.6	  we	  present	  estimates	  for	  our	  model	  
of	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  estimated	  separately	  for	  native-­‐born	  families	  and	  those	  families	  
with	  at	  least	  one	  foreign-­‐born	  parent;	  our	  estimates	  for	  our	  model	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending	  is	  
 49 
reported	  in	  Appendix	  Table	  2.7.	  For	  our	  models	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  
effects	  of	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  are	  roughly	  the	  same	  for	  both	  native-­‐born	  families	  (b	  =	  4.980,	  t	  =	  
19.88)	  and	  immigrant	  families	  (b	  =	  4.636,	  t	  =	  6.70).	  A	  similar	  pattern	  is	  observed	  for	  our	  models	  of	  support	  
for	  welfare	  spending;	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  have	  a	  similar	  effect	  for	  individuals	  from	  both	  native-­‐born	  
(b	  =	  0.309,	  t	  =	  9.51)	  and	  foreign-­‐born	  (b	  =	  0.453,	  t	  =	  4.82)	  families;	  if	  anything,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  pro-­‐
immigration	  scale	  is	  stronger	  for	  individuals	  from	  immigrant	  families	  than	  for	  native-­‐born	  families.	  	  
Ultimately,	  it	  appears	  that	  immigration	  attitudes	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  welfare	  attitudes,	  regardless	  of	  
immigration	  family	  status.	  
	   Pre-­‐	  vs.	  post-­‐welfare	  reform.	  	  One	  other	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  
attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  differs	  for	  the	  time	  periods	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Personal	  
Responsibility	  and	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act	  (1996),	  which	  was	  welfare-­‐reform	  legislation	  that,	  
among	  other	  things,	  limited	  immigrants’	  access	  to	  federally-­‐funded	  welfare	  programs.	  Indeed,	  PRWORA	  
prohibited	  the	  use	  of	  federal	  funds	  to	  provide	  welfare	  benefits	  to	  immigrants	  in	  their	  first	  five	  years	  in	  the	  
United	  States,	  though	  state	  governments	  were	  free	  to	  use	  their	  own	  funds	  to	  support	  immigrants	  and	  to	  
determine	  their	  own	  time	  limits	  and	  eligibility	  criteria.	  Since	  immigrants	  were	  eligible	  for	  welfare	  programs	  
prior	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  PRWORA,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  linkage	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  
welfare	  attitudes	  would	  be	  stronger	  prior	  to	  this	  act;	  after	  the	  act,	  immigrants	  were	  somewhat	  detached	  
from	  the	  welfare	  system,	  and	  Americans	  may	  have	  become	  less	  likely	  to	  connect	  their	  immigration	  
attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  as	  a	  result.	  In	  Appendix	  Table	  2.8	  we	  estimate	  our	  model	  of	  attitudes	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients	  separately	  for	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐reform	  periods,	  and	  we	  find	  that	  the	  pro-­‐
immigration	  variable	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically-­‐significant	  effect	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  both	  
time	  periods.	  The	  coefficient	  is	  about	  one-­‐third	  higher	  in	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  period	  (b	  =	  5.953,	  t	  =	  17.63)	  than	  
in	  the	  post-­‐reform	  period	  (b	  =	  4.408,	  t	  =	  13.65),	  indicating	  that	  immigration	  attitudes	  have	  a	  somewhat	  
stronger	  effect	  in	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  period.	  In	  addition,	  in	  Appendix	  Table	  2.9	  we	  estimate	  our	  model	  of	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attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending	  separately	  for	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐reform	  periods,	  and	  our	  findings	  are	  
similar:	  pro-­‐immigration	  attitudes	  have	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  attitudes	  toward	  welfare	  spending	  in	  
both	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  (b	  =	  0.365,	  t	  =	  7.03)	  and	  post-­‐reform	  (b	  =	  0.318,	  t	  =	  8.70)	  periods,	  though	  the	  
coefficient	  is	  moderately	  higher	  in	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  period.	  Overall,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  immigration	  
attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes	  is	  powerful	  both	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  PRWORA,	  though	  there	  is	  a	  slightly	  
stronger	  effect	  in	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  period.	  These	  findings	  point	  to	  the	  relative	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  
immigration	  attitudes	  on	  welfare	  attitudes,	  with	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐reform	  periods	  characterized	  by	  
positive	  coefficients	  that	  easily	  surpass	  conventional	  levels	  of	  statistical	  significance.	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  
the	  structural	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  attitudes	  and	  welfare	  attitudes	  is	  relatively	  unchanged	  as	  
one	  moves	  from	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  to	  the	  post-­‐reform	  period.	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Appendix	  Table	  2.1.	  Instrumental	  variables	  /	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares	  (IV-­‐2SLS)	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  support	  for	  
welfare	  spending,	  2012	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Affect	  Toward	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Support	  for	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Welfare	  Recipients	   	   	   	   	  Welfare	  Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (OLS	  Regression)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (Ordered	  Logit)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Instrumented	  immigrant	  attitudes	   	   	   	   	  6.414	   	   	  	  6.28***	   	   	   	  0.158	   	   	  	  4.53***	  	  	  	  	  
Attitudes	  toward	  blacks	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.114	   	   	  	  7.71***	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.60	  
Attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.452	   	   32.96***	   	   	   	  0.004	   	   	  	  8.67***	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Partisan	  identification	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.055	   	   -­‐6.32***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.054	   	   -­‐9.47***	  	  	  	  	  
Political	  ideology	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.002	   	   -­‐4.15***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.102	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐12.35***	  	  	  	  	  
Female	  respondent	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1.473	   	   	  	  2.80**	   	   	   	   	  0.056	   	   	  3.10***	  
Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.391	   	   	  	  1.52	   	   	   	   -­‐0.026	   	   -­‐2.99	  **	  	  	  	  
Family	  income	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.299	   	   -­‐8.26***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.017	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐13.50***	  	  	  	  	  
Age	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.860	   	   -­‐2.45**	   	   	   	   	  0.030	   	   	  	  2.48**	  
Age2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.072	   	   	  	  3.01**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002	   	   -­‐2.60**	  	  	  	  	  
Church	  attendance	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.469	   	   	  	  2.74**	   	   	   	   	  0.007	   	   	  	  1.20	  
Constant	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20.271	   	   12.28***	   	   	   	  0.056	   	   	  	  0.99	  
______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4574	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4569	  
Cragg-­‐Donald	  Wald	  F	  statistic	   	   	   	   	   	   427.56	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1011.80	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.000)	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.000)	  
Sargan	  statistic	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.879	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.230	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.644)	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.937)	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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Appendix	  Table	  2.2.	  First-­‐stage	  models	  for	  instrumental	  variables	  /	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares	  (2SLS)	  estimates	  for	  




	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Affect	  Toward	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Support	  for	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Welfare	  Recipients	   	   	   	   	  Welfare	  Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (OLS	  Regression)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (Ordered	  Logit)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Warrant	  for	  wiretaps	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.020	   	   	  	  2.23**	   	   	   	   	  	  0.021	   	   	  2.28**	  
Limits	  on	  foreign	  imports	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.076	   	   -­‐7.37***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.076	   	   -­‐7.41***	  
Immigrants	  take	  away	  jobs	  	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.258	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐33.43***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.260	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐33.63***	  
Attitudes	  toward	  blacks	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.005	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.56***	  	   	   	   	  	  0.005	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.68***	  
Attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.001	   	   	  3.94***	  	   	   	   	  	  0.002	   	   	  4.10***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.033	   	   -­‐7.50***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.033	   	   -­‐7.60***	  
Political	  ideology	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.043	   	   -­‐6.65***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.041	   	   -­‐6.39***	  
Female	  respondent	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.027	   	   -­‐1.84	   	   	   	   -­‐0.026	   	   -­‐1.79	  
Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.019	   	   	  	  2.70**	   	   	   	   	  	  0.017	   	   	  2.48**	  
Family	  income	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.000	   	   	  	  0.15	   	   	   	   	  	  0.000	   	   	  0.23	  
Age	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.055	   	   -­‐5.83***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.053	   	   -­‐5.62***	  
Age2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.003	   	   	  	  4.41***	   	   	   	  	  0.003	   	   	  4.23***	  
Church	  attendance	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.025	   	   	  	  5.42***	   	   	   	  	  0.026	   	   	  5.55***	  
	  
Constant	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  0.247	   	   	  	  5.32***	   	   	   	  	  0.231	   	   	  4.96***	  
______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4574	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4569	   	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.3825	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.3838	   	  
Partial	  R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.2195	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.2214	  
	  
Note:	  The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  each	  of	  these	  models	  is	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale.	  	  Separate	  estimates	  are	  provided	  
for	  the	  two	  welfare	  variables	  because	  of	  differences	  in	  sample	  sizes	  for	  the	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  
and	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending.	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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  Table	  2.3.	  OLS	  and	  ordered	  logit	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  support	  for	  




	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Affect	  Toward	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Support	  for	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Welfare	  Recipients	   	   	   	   	  Welfare	  Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (OLS	  Regression)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (Ordered	  Logit)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  4.647	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17.21***	  	   	   	   	  0.367	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.88***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.130	   	   	  6.66***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.002	   	   -­‐1.15	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.395	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17.36***	  	   	   	   	  0.016	   	   	  6.98***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.672	   	   -­‐4.49***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.138	   	   -­‐6.52***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.897	   	   -­‐4.63***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.319	   	   -­‐9.98***	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.718	   	   	  2.00*	   	   	   	   	  0.247	   	   	  3.55***	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.146	   	   -­‐1.48	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  0.17	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  2.16*	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.13	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.501	   	   	  2.14*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.063	   	   -­‐2.36**	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.443	   	   -­‐5.86***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.267	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐10.51***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.365	   	   	  2.42**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.010	   	   -­‐0.48	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐4.132	   	   -­‐5.37***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.393	   	   -­‐3.69***	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.879	   	   	  0.86	   	   	   	   	  0.484	   	   	  3.73***	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.079	   	   	  0.11	   	   	   	   	  0.527	   	   	  3.80***	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐3.304	   	   -­‐5.58***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.273	   	   -­‐2.77**	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   6811	   	   	   	   	   	   	   6806	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.344	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.134	  
F	  /	  χ2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   54.36	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1945.54	  
Prob	  (F)	   /	  Prob	  (χ2)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  Models	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  
surveys.	  The	  baseline	  (excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  each	  model	  is	  1992.	  The	  expected	  valence	  of	  the	  
coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  state	  fixed	  
effects	  and	  the	  cut	  points	  for	  the	  ordered	  logit	  model	  are	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  
standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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  Table	  2.4.	  Instrumental	  variables	  /	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares	  (IV-­‐2SLS)	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  affect	  
toward	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending,	  white	  respondents	  only,	  2012	  American	  National	  
Election	  Study	  	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Affect	  Toward	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Support	  for	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Welfare	  Recipients	   	   	   	   	  Welfare	  Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (OLS	  Regression)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (Ordered	  Logit)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Instrumented	  immigrant	  attitudes	  [+]	   	   	   	  8.180	   	   	  7.38***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  0.226	   	  	  	  	   	  5.96***	  
Attitudes	  toward	  blacks	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	  0.082	   	   	  4.80***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   -­‐0.002	   	  	  	   -­‐2.71**	  
Attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	   [+]	   	   	   	   	   	  0.467	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29.25***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  0.005	   	  	  	   	  8.39***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.567	   	   -­‐2.93**	  	  	  	  	   	   	   -­‐0.042	   	  	  	   -­‐6.43***	  
Political	  ideology	  	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.278	   	   -­‐4.51***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   -­‐0.108	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.23***	  
Female	  respondent	  	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1.382	   	   	  2.34**	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  0.071	   	   	  3.54***	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.394	   	   	  1.37	   	   	   	   -­‐0.021	   	   -­‐2.10*	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.249	   	   -­‐6.03***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   -­‐0.016	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.57***	  
Age	  	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.480	   	   -­‐1.20	   	   	   	   	  0.051	   	   	  3.73***	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.051	   	   	  1.89*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.003	   	   -­‐3.75***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.434	   	   	  2.25*	   	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  0.46	  
	  
Constant	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  8.551	   	   	  9.84***	  	  	  	  	   	   	   -­‐0.009	   	   -­‐0.13	  
______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3508	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3505	  
	  
Cragg-­‐Donald	  Wald	  F	  statistic	   	   	   	   	   	   356.43	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   353.66	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.000)	   	   	   	   	   	   (p	  <	  0.000)	  
Sargan	  statistic	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2.409	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.046	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (p=0.2998)	   	   	   	  	   	   	   (p=0.9773)	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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  Table	  2.5.	  First-­‐stage	  models	  for	  instrumental	  variables	  /	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares	  (2SLS)	  estimates	  for	  
models	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending,	  white	  respondents	  only,	  2012	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Affect	  Toward	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Support	  for	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Welfare	  Recipients	   	   	   	   	  Welfare	  Spending	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  (OLS	  Regression)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (Ordered	  Logit)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Warrant	  for	  wiretaps	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.157	   	   	  1.55	   	   	   	   	  0.016	   	   	  1.62	  
Limits	  on	  foreign	  imports	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.072	   	   -­‐6.29***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.071	   	   -­‐6.15***	  
Immigrants	  take	  away	  jobs	  	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.272	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐30.69***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.271	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐30.61***	  
Attitudes	  toward	  blacks	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.005	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.95***	  	   	   	   	  0.005	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.04***	  
Attitudes	  toward	  the	  poor	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  3.23***	  	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  3.31***	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Partisan	  identification	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.028	   	   -­‐5.48***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.029	   	   -­‐5.54***	  
Political	  ideology	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.045	   	   -­‐5.97***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.045	   	   -­‐5.87***	  
Female	  respondent	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.032	   	   -­‐1.98*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.034	   	   -­‐2.06*	  
Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.020	   	   	  2.58**	   	   	   	   	  0.020	   	   	  2.50*	  
Family	  income	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.64	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.69	  
Age	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.055	   	   -­‐5.10***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.055	   	   -­‐5.01***	  
Age2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  4.12***	  	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  4.04***	  
Church	  attendance	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.023	   	   	  4.41***	  	   	   	   	  0.024	   	   	  4.50***	  
	  
Constant	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.254	   	   	  4.72***	  	   	   	   	  0.244	   	   	  4.52***	  
______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3508	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3505	   	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.398	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.397	  
Partial	  R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.2343	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.2331	  
	  
Note:	  The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  each	  of	  these	  models	  is	  the	  pro-­‐immigration	  scale.	  	  Separate	  estimates	  are	  provided	  
for	  the	  two	  welfare	  variables	  because	  of	  differences	  in	  sample	  sizes	  for	  the	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients	  
and	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending.	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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Appendix	  Table	  2.6.	  OLS	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  by	  parents’	  nativity	  status,	  
selected	  years	  (1992-­‐2012),	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Both	  parents	  born	   	   	   	   At	  least	  one	  parent	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   In	  the	  United	  States	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  foreign-­‐born	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  4.980	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.88***	  	   	   	   	  4.636	   	   	  6.70***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.134	   	   	  7.15***	  	   	   	   	  0.089	   	   	  1.48	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.402	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.06***	  	   	   	   	  0.325	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.26***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.797	   	   -­‐5.20***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.962	   	   -­‐3.24***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.559	   	   -­‐2.78**	   	   	   	   -­‐1.371	   	   -­‐2.43**	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1.092	   	   	  2.57**	   	   	   	   -­‐1.310	   	   -­‐1.08	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2.064	   	   	  2.06*	   	   	   	   	  2.443	   	   	  0.89	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1.003	   	   	  1.00	   	   	   	   -­‐2.035	   	   -­‐1.12	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  8.160	   	   	  1.82*	   	   	   	   	  0.180	   	   	  0.09	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.157	   	   -­‐1.78*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.516	   	   -­‐2.87**	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  2.41**	   	   	   	   	  0.006	   	   	  3.00**	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.103	   	   	  0.37	   	   	   	   	  1.537	   	   	  3.16**	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.516	   	   -­‐5.11***	  	   	   	   -­‐1.882	   	   -­‐2.69**	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.252	   	   	  1.65*	   	   	   	   	  0.297	   	   	  0.60	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐3.348	   	   -­‐4.72***	  	   	   	   -­‐3.123	   	   -­‐1.21	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.108	   	   	  0.11	   	   	   	   	  6.850	   	   	  2.30*	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.090	   	   -­‐0.13	   	   	   	   -­‐0.329	   	   -­‐0.08	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.673	   	   -­‐4.08***	  	   	   	   -­‐1.684	   	   -­‐0.96	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7460	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1609	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.375	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.327	  
F	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   65.29	   	   	   	   	   	   	   11.70	  
Prob	  (F)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  Models	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  
surveys.	  The	  baseline	  (excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  each	  model	  is	  1992.	  The	  expected	  valence	  of	  the	  
coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  state	  fixed	  
effects	  are	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	  
	   	  
 57 
Appendix	  Table	  2.7.	  Ordered	  logit	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending,	  by	  parents’	  nativity	  status,	  
selected	  years	  (1992-­‐2012),	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  (CANES)	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Both	  parents	  born	   	   	   	   At	  least	  one	  parent	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   In	  the	  United	  States	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  foreign-­‐born	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.309	   	   	  9.51***	  	   	   	   	  0.453	   	   	  4.82***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐0.21	   	   	   	   -­‐0.012	   	   -­‐2.21*	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.016	   	   	  7.37***	  	   	   	   	  0.005	   	   	  2.24*	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.136	   	   -­‐7.96***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.200	   	   -­‐8.25***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.283	   	   -­‐9.72***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.248	   	   -­‐4.50***	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.252	   	   	  4.02***	  	   	   	   	  0.035	   	   	  0.22	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.469	   	   	  4.60***	  	   	   	   	  0.226	   	   	  0.80	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.243	   	   	  1.95*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.098	   	   -­‐0.52	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.705	   	   	  1.09	   	   	   	   -­‐0.351	   	   -­‐1.45	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.001	   	   	  0.13	   	   	   	   -­‐0.012	   	   -­‐0.80	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	  0.06	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	  0.46	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.067	   	   -­‐2.27*	   	   	   	   -­‐0.006	   	   -­‐0.10	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.257	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐11.12***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.366	   	   -­‐5.83***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.026	   	   -­‐1.43	   	   	   	   	  0.071	   	   	  1.87*	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.268	   	   -­‐2.48**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.903	   	   -­‐3.51***	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.370	   	   	  2.43**	   	   	   	   	  0.888	   	   	  2.84**	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.499	   	   	  3.83***	  	   	   	   	  1.003	   	   	  3.04**	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.263	   	   -­‐2.72**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.191	   	   -­‐1.43	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   7457	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1595	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.134	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.168	  
χ2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2085.22	   	   	   	   	   	   	   507.51	  
Prob	  (χ2)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  Models	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  1992,	  1994,	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  
surveys.	  The	  baseline	  (excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  each	  model	  is	  1992.	  The	  expected	  valence	  of	  the	  
coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  state	  fixed	  
effects	  and	  the	  cut	  points	  from	  the	  ordered	  logit	  models	  are	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  
standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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Appendix	  Table	  2.8.	  OLS	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  affect	  toward	  welfare	  recipients,	  by	  pre-­‐	  or	  post-­‐reform	  period,	  
selected	  years	  (1992-­‐2012),	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Pre-­‐welfare	  reform	   	   	   	   Post-­‐welfare	  reform	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  5.953	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17.63***	  	   	   	   	  4.408	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.65***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.196	   	   	  6.85***	  	   	   	   	  0.109	   	   	  4.76***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.266	   	   	  9.04***	  	   	   	   	  0.427	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.09***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.878	   	   -­‐5.70***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.803	   	   -­‐3.77***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.819	   	   -­‐3.50***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.698	   	   -­‐3.31	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.124	   	   -­‐1.43	   	   	   	   	  1.380	   	   	  2.90	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.989	   	   -­‐0.61	   	   	   	   	  3.582	   	   	  3.88***	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.998	   	   	  0.38	   	   	   	   -­‐3.239	   	   -­‐2.77	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.964	   	   -­‐0.39	   	   	   	   	  1.930	   	   	  0.46	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.014	   	   -­‐0.10	   	   	   	   -­‐0.263	   	   -­‐2.80	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	  0.31	   	   	   	   	  0.003	   	   	  3.53***	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.113	   	   	  0.34	   	   	   	   	  0.403	   	   	  1.57	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.604	   	   -­‐4.71***	  	   	   	   -­‐1.547	   	   -­‐4.91***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.205	   	   	  0.99	   	   	   	   	  0.230	   	   	  1.29	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.813	   	   -­‐4.04***	  	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   -­‐1.335	   	   -­‐1.57	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   -­‐3.970	   	   -­‐4.90***	  	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2543	   	   	   	   	   	   	   6543	  
R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.320	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.378	  
F	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   23.91	   	   	   	   	   	   	   59.72	  
Prob	  (F)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  model	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  1992	  and	  1994	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  estimates	  
from	  the	  post-­‐reform	  model	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  baseline	  
(excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  model	  is	  1992	  while	  for	  the	  post-­‐reform	  model	  the	  baseline	  
year	  is	  2012.	  The	  expected	  valence	  of	  the	  coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  
of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  year	  fixed	  effects and	  the	  cut	  points	  from	  the	  ordered	  logit	  models	  are	  not	  reported.	  The	  
reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	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Appendix	  Table	  2.9.	  Ordered	  logit	  estimates	  for	  models	  of	  support	  for	  welfare	  spending,	  by	  pre-­‐	  or	  post-­‐reform	  
period,	  selected	  years	  (1992-­‐2012),	  Cumulative	  American	  National	  Election	  Study	  (CANES)	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Pre-­‐welfare	  reform	   	   	   	   Post-­‐welfare	  reform	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Variable	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  b	   	   	   	  	  	  	  t	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Pro-­‐Immigration	  factor	  score	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.365	   	   	  7.03***	  	   	   	   	  0.318	   	   	  8.70***	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  blacks	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.002	   	   	  0.84	   	   	   	   -­‐0.003	   	   -­‐1.94	  
Feeling	  thermometer:	  the	  poor	  [+]	   	   	   	   	  0.012	   	   	  4.03***	  	   	   	   	  0.014	   	   	  6.05***	  
	  
Partisan	  identification	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.125	   	   -­‐4.81***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.157	   	   -­‐6.48***	  
Political	  ideology	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.215	   	   -­‐3.71***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.297	   	   -­‐7.51***	  
Female	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.117	   	   	  1.45	   	   	   	   	  0.257	   	   	  3.35***	  
Black	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.444	   	   	  2.76*	   	   	   	   	  0.482	   	   	  4.52***	  
Hispanic	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.113	   	   -­‐0.63	   	   	   	   	  0.224	   	   	  2.26*	  
Asian	  respondent	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.407	   	   -­‐1.24	   	   	   	   	  0.548	   	   	  1.17	  
Age	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.014	   	   	  0.81	   	   	   	   -­‐0.003	   	   -­‐0.29	  
Age2	  [+]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   -­‐1.01	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	  0.46	  
Education	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.128	   	   -­‐3.15**	   	   	   	   -­‐0.048	   	   -­‐1.32	  
Family	  income	  [-­‐]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.263	   	   -­‐4.60***	  	   	   	   -­‐0.281	   	   -­‐8.63***	  
Church	  attendance	  [+]	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.057	   	   -­‐2.04*	   	   	   	   	  0.006	   	   	  0.32	  
	  
Survey	  year:	  1994	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.358	   	   -­‐3.54**	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Survey	  year:	  2004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.751	   	   	  5.77***	  
Survey	  year:	  2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.793	   	   	  7.89***	  
Survey	  year:	  2012	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
N	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2532	   	   	   	   	   	   	   6537	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.110	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.144	  
χ2	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   547.80	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1974.31	  
Prob	  (χ2)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0000	  
	  
Note:	  The	  estimates	  for	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  model	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  1992	  and	  1994	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  estimates	  
from	  the	  post-­‐reform	  model	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  2004,	  2008,	  and	  2012	  CANES	  surveys.	  The	  baseline	  
(excluded)	  year	  comparison	  group	  for	  the	  pre-­‐reform	  model	  is	  1992	  while	  for	  the	  post-­‐reform	  model	  the	  baseline	  
year	  is	  2012.	  The	  expected	  valence	  of	  the	  coefficients	  is	  found	  in	  brackets	  following	  each	  variable	  name.	  For	  the	  sake	  
of	  brevity,	  coefficients	  for	  year	  fixed	  effects and	  the	  cut	  points	  from	  the	  ordered	  logit	  models	  are	  not	  reported.	  The	  
reported	  t	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  standard	  errors	  calculated	  using	  clustering	  by	  state.	  
	  
	  
***prob	  <	  0.001	   **	  prob	  <	  0.01	   *	  	  prob	  <	  0.05	  
	  
